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  INTRODUCTION 
Do corporate boards care about compliance? Surely they 
should, because of the potentially catastrophic consequences of 
ignoring it. Take the example of the recent compliance failures 
at Wells Fargo, the large bank, which pioneered a strategy of 
“cross-selling” financial products to its customers.1 This turned 
out to be profitable, and the bank sought to maximize its rollout 
by setting branch staff powerful financial incentives to maximize 
sales of financial products to its customers. 2  Unfortunately, 
these incentives triggered widespread fraud on the part of the 
bank’s employees, with customers discovering products had been 
charged to their names without their consent.3 After the Wells 
Fargo scandal broke, regulators identified numerous weak-
nesses in the firm’s compliance programs that had permitted the 
misconduct to go unchecked.4 The bank ultimately paid about 
$575 million in fines and settlements and fired over 5,000 em-
ployees; the CEO resigned after Congressional hearings.5 In re-
sponse, the Board commissioned an outside investigation into 
 
 1. Consolidated Amended Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint ¶ 1, 
In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 4, 2017) (No. 16-05541) [hereinafter Wells Fargo Complaint] (alleging 
defendants “defrauded their customers in an attempt to drive up ‘cross-selling,’ 
i.e., selling complementary Wells Fargo banking products to prospective or ex-
isting customers”). 
 2. Proposed Order to Cease & Desist at 2, In re Wells Fargo & Co., No. 18-
007-B-HC (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 2018) [hereinafter Wells 
Fargo Proposed Order] (“[T]he Firm pursued a business strategy that empha-
sized sales and growth without ensuring that senior management had estab-
lished and maintained an adequate risk management framework commensu-
rate with the size and complexity of the Firm, which resulted in weak 
compliance practices[.]”).  
 3. Wells Fargo Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 4. Wells Fargo Proposed Order, supra note 2, at 2. 
 5. Chris Arnold, Wells Fargo Fires 5,000 Employees Over Fake Accounts, 
NPR (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/09/09/493228759/wells-fargo 
-fires-5-000-employees-over-fake-accounts [https://perma.cc/H7X6-BD79]; 
Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo to Pay States About $575 Million to Settle Customer 
Harm Claims, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells 
-fargo-to-pay-states-about-575-million-to-settle-customer-harm-claims 
-11546016757. The subsequent scrutiny brought other compliance problems to 
light. (“The bank has paid out more than $4 billion in settlements and fines 
since September 2016, much of it stemming from problems that came to light 
following the sales scandal.”). 
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how this compliance failure happened on its watch.6 Yet, federal 
regulators were deeply unsatisfied with the Board’s response. In 
early 2018, the Federal Reserve took the unusual step of restrict-
ing the growth of the bank as four Board members departed; the 
Fed also sent a letter to the former Lead Director, describing his 
“many pervasive and serious compliance and conduct failures.”7  
This regulatory intervention and board shakeup was un-
precedented, but similarly massive failures involving some of the 
largest corporations have been common in recent years—from 
Enron and WorldCom to BP, HSBC, General Motors, 
Volkswagen, and Wells Fargo—resulting in billions paid to en-
forcers in the United States and changes in corporate govern-
ance.8 Amidst the notoriety attracted by these failures, have san-
guine corporate boards taken on a more substantial oversight 
role in compliance? Surprisingly little literature exists on the 
role of boards in compliance.9 In this Article, we present the first 
empirical examination of this question, using data from public 
filings and corporate prosecutions. Based on these findings, and 
on additional information gathered from compliance charters, 
news reports, and our conversations with compliance committee 
and independent board members, we suggest why boards con-
tinue to remain quite reluctant to supervise compliance more ac-
tively.10 
 
 6. INDEP. DIRS. OF BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICES INVES-
TIGATION REPORT (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/ 
pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/UUQ5-8YMZ].  
 7. John Heltman, Fed Drops Hammer on Wells Fargo as Four Board Mem-
bers Ousted, AM. BANKER (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/ 
news/fed-drops-hammer-on-wells-fargo-as-four-board-members-fired [https:// 
perma.cc/E5V6-4TZC]; see Wells Fargo Proposed Order, supra note 2. 
 8. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COM-
PROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 292–93 (2014) (detailing the top twenty corporate 
fines between 2001 and 2012). 
 9. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the 
New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1134 (2003) 
(describing several business models which rely heavily on active monitoring by 
the board). For additional examples of board-solicited investigations into com-
pliance breakdowns, see, for example, ANTON B. VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY (May 29, 2014), https://www 
.aieg.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Valukas-report-on-gm-redacted2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2TQ-RG3R] 
 10. See infra Part III. 
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In Part I, we introduce the field of compliance and the role 
of boards in supervising compliance. Compliance programs are 
internal enforcement programs, whereby firms train, monitor, 
and discipline employees with respect to applicable laws and reg-
ulations.11 For the past quarter-century, U.S. authorities have 
offered explicit incentives for corporations to implement such 
programs. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations 
provide a discount for convicted firms that have in place an “ef-
fective” compliance program.12 A firm’s compliance effort is also 
taken into consideration in deciding whether to prosecute the 
firm should misconduct emerge.13 Prosecutors say they take into 
account the effectiveness of a company’s compliance program—
as well as subsequent remedial compliance measures—when de-
ciding whether to charge a firm criminally, and the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) has provided detailed guidance on compliance 
in this context.14 A range of regulatory agencies similarly uses 
both carrots and sticks to encourage compliance.15 The common 
 
 11. See Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. 203, 205–09 
(2019) (illustrating the various responsibilities of compliance programs using 
the example of the Twenty-First Century Fox and Fox News sexual harassment 
compliance program). 
 12. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.5–2.6 (U.S. SENTENC-
ING COMM’N 2016).  
 13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIV., FRAUD SECTION, EVALUATION 
OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2014) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2014], https://www.justice.gov/criminal 
-fraud/page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/QJA8-SEEF] (last updated 
Apr. 2019); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, FRAUD SECTION, EVAL-
UATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2017) [hereinafter EVALUA-
TION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017] (on file with authors); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2018) [here-
inafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/archives/usam/ 
archives/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations 
#9-28.800 [https://perma.cc/Z42K-JF4T]. 
 14. See supra note 13. 
 15. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.601–606 (2018) (detailing reporting requirements 
for organizational compliance with the Office of Foreign Assets Control); Con-
tractor Business Ethics Compliance Program and Disclosure Requirements, 73 
Fed. Reg. 67,064, 67,091–67,092 (Nov. 12, 2008); Incentives for Self-Policing: 
Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 
19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000) (discussing the policies of the Environmental Protection 
Agency intended to prevent harm to human health and the environment by 
providing for reporting of violations); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission, Identifying Cooperation Factors That May Reduce a Litigant’s 
Sanctions (Aug. 11, 2004); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of 
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theme is that even if employees engage in misconduct, the firm 
will receive more lenient treatment so long as it had put in place 
a meaningful compliance program.  
Boards are formally responsible for oversight of corpora-
tions,16 and directors owe their firms fiduciary duties of loyalty.17 
While these duties traditionally did not explicitly include com-
pliance,18 this changed in the mid-1990s, when Chancellor Allen 
delivered his well-known opinion in Caremark.19 Reflecting the 
growing significance of corporate compliance efforts in prosecu-
tion and sentencing, Chancellor Allen stated that boards now 
needed to assure themselves that their firm had “information 
and reporting systems . . . that are reasonably designed to pro-
 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Rela-
tionship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001) (asking, among factors informing SEC discre-
tion, “[d]id the company adopt and ensure enforcement of new and more 
effective internal controls and procedures designed to prevent a recurrence of 
the misconduct?”); IRS, GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(c)(3) ORGAN-
IZATIONS (2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance_practices.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LM6M-WYCM] (“The organization’s governing body bears the 
ultimate responsibility for setting ethical standards and ensuring they perme-
ate the organization and inform its practices.”). 
 16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019) (“The business and af-
fairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 17. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006); see also Mills Acquisition 
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“[D]irectors owe fiduci-
ary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.”); Polk v. 
Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986) (“In performing their duties the directors 
owe fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the corporation and its 
shareholders.”). 
 18. Prior Delaware caselaw had suggested that directors were “entitled to 
rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs 
to put them on suspicion that something is wrong”—that is, a “red flag.” Gra-
ham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). 
 19. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and 
Stone: Directors’ Evolving Duty To Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323 (J. 
Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (discussing the evolution of Delaware law relating to 
directors’ duty to oversee compliance following Caremark and other leading 
cases on the subject); Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A 
Twenty-Year Lookback, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 727 (2018) (reviewing subsequent 
developments since Caremark); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good 
Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719 (2007) (detailing the history of the Caremark 
decision).  
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vide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accu-
rate information sufficient to allow management and the board, 
each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning 
both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business per-
formance.”20 
Should such a system of oversight give an indication of prob-
lems—a so-called “red flag”—then the board is expected to take 
steps to investigate and take remedial action.21 However, all as-
pects of this “oversight duty”—both to ensure some system of 
oversight exists, and to take action if it flags a problem—are sub-
ject to the business judgment rule.22 This means that liability is 
triggered only by a failure so egregious as to call into question 
the board’s good faith.23 The rationale is that the board, not the 
court, knows best how to pursue the firm’s internal compliance 
activities.24  
As we have seen, both fiduciary duty case law and guidance 
from prosecutors and regulators suggest that the board should 
have a continuing role in overseeing compliance activity. DOJ 
Guidance goes so far as to suggest that there should be a direct 
reporting channel from compliance officers to independent mem-
bers of the board to avoid possible conflicts created by going 
 
 20. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 21. See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130 (“[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the 
honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them 
on suspicion that something is wrong.”); Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. 
v. Corbat, No. 12151, 2017 WL 6452240, at *7–10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017); Mel-
bourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund v. Jacobs, No. 10872, 2016 WL 
4076369, at *8–11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2016); In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative 
& Class Action Litig., No. 5430, 2011 WL 2176479, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 31, 
2011) (“If the fiduciaries of a Delaware corporation do not like an applicable 
law . . . until it is changed, they must act in good faith to ensure that the corpo-
ration tries to comply with its legal duties.”); cf. Wells Fargo Proposed Order, 
supra note 2 (outlining expectations for the board to improve its compliance ef-
forts). 
 22. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (stating that while the obligation to be 
well-apprised of the firm’s compliant operations may be placed upon boards, the 
determination of specific means for monitoring are left to the judgment of the 
firm).  
 23. The necessary degree of oversight failure to trigger liability was later 
characterized by the Delaware Supreme Court as an “utter[ ]  fail[ure] to imple-
ment any reporting or information controls.” Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 
(Del. 2006). 
 24. As Chancellor Allen stated in Caremark: “Obviously the level of detail 
that is appropriate for such an information system is a question of business 
judgment.” Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
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through the CEO. 25  Little relevant guidance, however, pre-
scribes any particular way in which firms should pursue their 
compliance oversight function.  
One approach towards formalizing board oversight of com-
pliance is for boards to add compliance to the remit of their audit 
committees. Following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, all public 
companies are required to have an audit committee, comprised 
exclusively of independent directors, whose job it is to manage 
the company’s relationship with its auditor and oversee its inter-
nal financial controls.26 Given this mandatory oversight function 
in relation to internal financial controls, boards may see it as a 
natural extension to ask their audit committee also to oversee 
the company’s more general compliance with applicable laws. 
Yet the range of issues raised by compliance with applicable laws 
generally is likely quite different from those arising specifically 
in relation to financial reporting, implying that more capacity, 
and different expertise, may be required. Companies that draw 
this conclusion may establish, separately from the audit commit-
tee, a distinct compliance committee tasked with oversight of 
compliance matters other than financial reporting.  
The Wells Fargo case is a sharp reminder that so-called 
“compliance programs” are not always meaningful; nor is the cor-
responding board “oversight.” Many have asked, in the wake of 
large corporate scandals, why responsible officers such as CEOs 
and managers did not detect and prevent wrongdoing.27 Such 
questions should also be asked about corporate boards. Compli-
ance with regulations and criminal statutes can dramatically af-
fect the performance and success of a company; the stakes can 
be as high as those for product design, marketing, or strategic 
planning. Yet little is known about the nature, extent, and effi-
cacy of corporate compliance endeavors, or how boards pursue 
their role in overseeing them. 
 
 25. See EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra 
note 13, at 10 (suggesting that one way prosecutors should measure effective 
implementation of compliance programs is whether “those responsible for com-
pliance have  . . . direct access to the board of directors”).  
 26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 746 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j–1 (2012)). 
 27. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 
112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINAN-
CIAL COLLAPSE 183–87 (2011) (describing, for example, weak management 
practices reaching the CEO and Board level at Washington Mutual). 
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Firms are not required to report details of their compliance 
activities and few, if any, make voluntary disclosures regarding 
compliance.28  At the same time, practitioner surveys consist-
ently report that compliance plays a growing influence in corpo-
rate life, including the boardroom.29 This has led some commen-
tators to conclude corporate governance has undergone a 
“revolution,” with the board’s oversight role in internal corporate 
affairs “overtaken by compliance.”30 Others, however, are more 
skeptical, arguing that corporate law fiduciary duties do not suf-
ficiently incentivize boards to engage with compliance.31 Plausi-
bly, common patterns of executive and director compensation 
may create incentives to under-invest in long-term compliance 
activities.32  Further, some point to detailed provisions about 
compliance in deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) that 
firms enter into with the authorities to avoid prosecution. 33 
 
 28. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 2075, 2100 (2016). 
 29. See, e.g., PWC, PWC STATE OF COMPLIANCE STUDY 2016, at 3 (2016), 
https://www.pwc.se/sv/pdf-reports/state-of-compliance-study-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/737K-PH4L] (detailing the increasing trend towards board 
member involvement in compliance efforts). 
 30. See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compli-
ance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2135, 2146 (2019) (describing “explosive growth of com-
pliance departments” over the past decade); Griffith, supra note 28, at 2077 
(“American corporate governance has undergone a quiet revolution. Much of its 
basic role . . . has been overtaken by compliance.”). 
 31. See Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 
27, 50–51 (2013) (arguing factors such as declining stock price and personal 
criminal liability are more influential on corporate actors than the risk of pri-
vate liability under Caremark); Langevoort, supra note 19, at 739–41 (suggest-
ing board members’ compliance incentives may be at odds with their responsi-
bilities to the organization’s financial well-being in situations where corporate 
malfeasance has already occurred); John Armour et al., Taking Compliance Se-
riously, 37 YALE J. REG. 1, 45–47 (2020); cf. W. Robert Thomas, The Ability and 
Responsibility of Corporate Law to Improve Criminal Fines, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 
601, 647–50 (2017) (suggesting a corporate clawback bylaw would better incen-
tivize officers to prioritize compliance efforts).  
 32. See Armour et al., supra note 31, at 31–38. 
 33. See Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limit-
ing Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN 
THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 
62, 76–81 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (describing the 
dual purposes of DPAs as both detection and sanctioning of wrongs, and inter-
vention in affairs of unconvicted corporations to ensure compliance); Jennifer 
Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation through Nonprosecu-
tion, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 355–58 (2017) (referring to deferred prosecution 
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These commonly prescribe enhancements to compliance pro-
grams, and sometimes mention board oversight.34 Would it be 
necessary for prosecutors to demand that companies do more if 
boards were already taking these issues seriously? These con-
flicting perspectives and the lack of clear evidence make it hard 
to discern whether Wells Fargo and its ilk are just “bad apples” 
or reflect a more systematic lack of engagement with compliance 
by public company boards. This is an insecure foundation for pol-
icy.  
In Part II, we present our empirical results and explore the 
results in light of prior literature. We exploit the fact that firms 
are required to report details of their board structure in their 
public filings to compile what is to our knowledge the first quan-
titative evidence on the board’s role in compliance. We explore 
the hypotheses developed in Part I using director-level data from 
BoardEx and data on federal organizational prosecutions from 
the Duke University and University of Virginia Corporate Pros-
ecution Registry.35 We find that, contrary to statistics reported 
in practitioner surveys, board-level Compliance Committees are 
still quite rare in U.S. public companies. Although the proportion 
of firms adopting such committees has risen significantly over 
time, less than five percent of U.S. public companies have estab-
lished a separate Compliance Committee.36 In other words, the 
 
agreements as “pretrial diversion agreements” in their discussion of the role of 
prosecutorial tools in influencing corporate compliance); James R. Copeland, 
The Shadow Regulatory State: The Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 14 
CIV. JUST. REP., May 2012, at 1; Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prose-
cution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 854–61 (2007) (describing the use of DPAs as a “spur 
for institutional reform”). 
 34. See Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing of Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 435, 457–60 (2014) (characterizing DPAs as part of a “new policing 
framework” of business crime); Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra 
note 33, at 886–902 (providing data on the use of deferred prosecution agree-
ments to mandate increases in compliance activity); Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. 
Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from 1993–2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61, 82–84, 92–99 (2014) 
(discussing the use of deferred prosecution agreements to effectuate changes in 
corporate governance and providing data on the growing use of DPAs between 
1993 and 2013). 
 35. Jon Ashley & Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Prosecution Registry, 
DUKE U. L. & UVA L. LEGAL DATA LAB, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/ 
corporate-prosecution-registry/index.html [https://perma.cc/7U29-3EGU]. 
 36. See discussion infra Part II. 
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vast bulk of public company boards do not have a stand-alone 
compliance oversight function.  
This finding appears starkly at odds with the practitioner 
literature asserting a compliance “revolution.” This is unset-
tling; but how concerned should we be? Does this mean that 
boards are not taking compliance seriously? An immediate issue 
is whether establishing a dedicated compliance committee (what 
we measure) actually makes a difference—as opposed to adding 
compliance to the audit committee’s to-do list—or is simply a cos-
metic exercise. To shed light on this, we review compliance com-
mittee (CC) and audit committee (AC) charters. These suggest 
material differences: CCs are expected to engage in much more 
focused oversight of compliance policies and personnel than typ-
ical ACs. Moreover, interviews with practitioners suggest board 
members view setting up a CC as a significant matter.37 Boards 
work under tight time constraints, and so there is a real oppor-
tunity cost to adding a CC: time used in staffing this committee 
must be foregone elsewhere. Establishing a new committee, it 
seems, is not a trivial matter. 
In light of this, it is important to understand why CCs are 
so rare. We use our data to explore why boards (do not) establish 
compliance committees. We present four main findings. First, 
companies that get prosecuted are much more likely to establish 
CCs. Yet this is not because prosecutors tell them to. In a com-
prehensive dataset of 374 DPAs and plea bargains entered into 
by public companies from 2001 onwards,38 only five agreements 
(less than two percent) actually stipulate the creation of some 
kind of board compliance committee. Rather, the link appears 
indirect. Prosecutors frequently demand enhancements to a 
firm’s compliance activities as part of these settlements; this cre-
ates a sharp increase in need for compliance oversight, which 
boards rationally meet by establishing committees. 
Second, we find only weak links between factors that might 
make a firm’s exposure to potential prosecution seem more 
likely—such as being in a heavily regulated sector, or a high rate 
of prior prosecution in their industry. This suggests that even 
when compliance might be very important to a particular type of 
 
 37. This is based on our confidential interviews with compliance profession-
als at S&P 500 companies at the beginning of the project.  
 38. Ashley & Garrett, supra note 35. 
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firm, firms are not taking it sufficiently seriously to justify es-
tablishment of a dedicated committee. These results suggest 
that boards take compliance more seriously after their firm got 
caught. Does this imply a troublingly low background level of 
board compliance oversight? Our other results give further cause 
for concern.  
Third, we find that outside experience of board compliance 
oversight makes a difference. Companies with a board member 
who also sits on the board of a firm that already has a compliance 
committee are much more likely to establish one themselves. 
This finding suggests that experience matters, consistent with 
the general literature of diffusion of innovations. Moreover, it 
suggests that these directors’ experience of board compliance is 
generally positive, as it increases the likelihood of adoption by 
other boards on which they serve. Why, then, are compliance 
committees not more widely adopted? 
Fourth, we find that firms with compliance committees tend 
to be larger and find suggestive evidence that they have bigger 
boards. This reinforces the idea that compliance oversight en-
tails real costs for the firms: bigger firms have more capacity for 
compliance expenditures; bigger boards can more easily manage 
the use of board resources.39 This may mean that boards often 
lack the capacity to do compliance oversight other than as an AC 
addendum.  
Taken together, these results are at once intriguing and 
troubling. While our data do not permit any causal interpreta-
tion of the findings, they are consistent with theoretical claims 
that compliance is more often overlooked, rather than overseen, 
by boards. Moreover, they raise a question within corporate gov-
ernance about optimal board size. Small boards may be best from 
the own-firm shareholder point of view but not from the social or 
diversified shareholder point of view, when compliance is taken 
into account.40 A small board lacks resources for sufficient com-
pliance oversight, and it also creates a baseline in which adop-
tion of a CC signals that the board believes the firm has an 
 
 39. We also make a complementary finding that firms with dedicated com-
pliance committees tend to have smaller audit committees. For these firms, the 
audit committee has less capacity, and so is less able to accommodate having 
compliance added to its list of tasks.  
 40. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 
88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 293–94 (1980) (providing agency theory for adoption of 
small boards, as well as independent directors). 
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above-average compliance problem, which may negatively affect 
stock price. The desire to avoid giving such a signal could become 
a reason for a board not to establish a CC, even when such a 
committee would be warranted.  
In Part III, we consider ways in which board compliance 
might be facilitated or encouraged: reconsidering norms about 
board size and independence, enhancing accountability of direc-
tors to regulators, and tightening state law fiduciary duties re-
garding oversight. We emphasize that our results are just a first 
step—albeit an important one—and our conclusions are corre-
spondingly tentative. We hope others will engage with the puz-
zles they raise, and that the nature and success of board compli-
ance will attract the attention that its importance to policy 
deserves.  
In summary, in Part I, we introduce our research questions. 
We review the rationale for compliance programs, and more spe-
cifically, the board’s oversight role. In Part II, we present our 
empirical results and seek to interpret them in light of prior lit-
erature. Part III concludes with a discussion of the implications 
of these findings for corporate governance, enforcement, and for 
policy.  
I.  BOARDS AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE   
In this Part, we describe the rise in compliance-focused ac-
tivity in U.S. corporations, and why, as a result, we and others 
would have assumed that a fairly large proportion of public com-
panies would have embraced board-level compliance oversight 
through a bespoke committee. We first describe what compliance 
programs are and their rationales. We describe the incentives 
offered by a range of regulators to enhance the compliance func-
tion, including through definitions of “effective compliance.”41 
Second, we describe data from the Duke and University of Vir-
ginia Corporate Prosecution Registry, concerning criminal pros-
ecutions of corporations, which often seek to bolster compliance, 
but which have only in rare occasions required a board-level 
compliance committee. Third, we describe the relationship be-
tween the board and compliance, including its fiduciary relation-
ship, and more specifically, through the creation of compliance 
committees. 
 
 41. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing effective compliance programs). 
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A. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THEIR RATIONALES 
Corporations are structured to give managers incentives to 
generate returns for their investors. In areas where corporate 
activities may create negative externalities, regulatory obliga-
tions—with civil or criminal penalties—are commonly imposed 
on firms to ensure that investors’ returns are aligned with social 
welfare. For example, environmental obligations seek to ensure 
that the costs of industrial pollution are internalized by polluters 
and not shed onto society at large.42 Similarly, workplace and 
product safety regulations set minimum standards for firms 
with respect to harms to which their work environment or prod-
ucts may expose workers or consumers.43 And laws prohibiting 
bribery and corruption, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977 (FCPA), seek to prevent firms from undermining the 
functioning of public institutions.44  
For regulation to succeed in making companies internalize 
the social costs of their activities, however, there must be en-
forcement.45 Where the probability of enforcement is low, it is 
necessary to introduce a very high penalty so as to set the ex-
pected cost of non-compliance equal to the social costs of the pro-
scribed conduct. In the context of corporate misconduct, high 
penalties are not uncommon. For example, BP paid $62 billion 
in fines and clean-up costs after its Deepwater Horizon oil spill.46 
Wells Fargo has also been subjected to an order by the Federal 
Reserve freezing its growth until compliance failures are reme-
died, and the company has paid more than $575 million in fines 
and settlements to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Securities and 
 
 42. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012); Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 7401 (2012). 
 43. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (2012) (“[A]uthorizing the Secretary of 
Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and health standards applicable to 
businesses affecting interstate commerce.”). 
 44. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012).  
 45. Where the firm’s actions harm those who contract with it—customers, 
investors, employees, and so forth—then violations of rules will attract market 
sanctions in the form of harm to its reputation. The problem of enforcement is 
therefore most acute as respects harms caused by the firm’s actions to persons 
with whom it does not contract. 
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Exchange Commission, the DOJ, and the States.47 Moreover, if 
a firm depends on a regulatory license, then penalties that re-
move this license can effectively force it out of business.  
However, imposing very high corporate penalties has real ex 
post costs: jobs may be lost, and firms forced into bankruptcy.48 
Enforcers do not relish the prospect of destroying a company, 
particularly the collateral consequences of doing so, where many 
employees shared no role in wrongdoing and investors suffer fi-
nancial losses.49  It is against this background that corporate 
compliance programs emerged. The basic idea is that because 
firms have better information about their employees’ character 
and behavior than does a regulator, firms can monitor misbehav-
ior in a cheaper way than can public authorities, and it is conse-
quently efficient to delegate.   
“Compliance” is the name given to institutions established 
internally by firms to carry out such delegated enforcement. 
Such institutions can reduce the incidence of misconduct and the 
need for socially wasteful corporate penalties.50  However, in-
stalling a compliance program may itself have an ambiguous ef-
fect on a firm’s expected penalties. While it will likely lower the 
incidence of misconduct, it will also likely increase the rate of 
detection of any misconduct that does occur.51 If the effect on ex-
pected liabilities is ambiguous, it may be hard for managers to 
justify expenditure on compliance programs.52  
1. Regulating Compliance  
To generate additional incentives to adopt compliance pro-
grams, firms are offered explicit discounts to any penalties that 
 
 47. Wells Fargo Proposed Order, supra note 2; Glazer, supra note 5. 
 48. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 8, at 42 (describing the perception that 
federal prosecutors were responsible for destroying Arthur Andersen). 
 49. See id. at 252 (describing remarks by then Attorney General Eric 
Holder stating that a prosecution of a financial firm could have negative effects 
on the United States and world economy). 
 50. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Crim-
inal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUDS. 833, 846 (1994) (indicating increased corpo-
rate enforcement would reduce corporate crimes). 
 51. See id. at 836 (concluding that increasing enforcement expenditures 
would increase the probability of detection). 
 52. See id. (discussing conflicting incentives created under enforcement ex-
penditures). 
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might be imposed for misconduct, if they had previously imple-
mented an effective compliance program.53 These incentives are 
delivered generally in the form of a discount to sentencing under 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,54 a factor to be taken into 
consideration in deciding whether to prosecute a corporation,55 
and guidance for various government agencies assessing 
whether to exclude a convicted firm from procurement opportu-
nities.56  
There are also specific requirements associated with compli-
ance and internal controls for a range of sector and activity-spe-
cific regulatory obligations. These include anti-money launder-
ing, insider trading and structural separation checks for 
financial institutions,57 checks regarding the making of corrupt 
payments for all firms,58 internal controls over the production of 
financial information for publicly-traded firms,59 and a set of 
 
 53. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12, § 8C2.5(f) 
(subtracting culpability score if the organization had an effective compliance 
program). This was introduced generally in 1991, with the adoption of the Or-
ganizational Sentencing Guidelines, and earlier in certain regulatory settings. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13 (discussing factors prose-
cutors should consider when evaluating compliance programs); EVALUATION OF 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra note 13 (same); EVALUATION 
OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017, supra note 13 (same).  
 56. See FAR 9.406-1(a), .407-1(a)(2) (2018) (listing factors the official should 
consider). The lowering of sanctions fits with the general theory of optimal en-
forcement: since the firm’s own “compliance” activities increase the likelihood 
of detection, the sanction for non-compliance should be reduced to avoid over-
deterrence and then, in the next period, a hollowing out of the firm’s compliance 
efforts.  
 57. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012) 
(regulating safeguards against insider trading by personnel); Foreign Bank Se-
crecy Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012) (regulating anti-money laundering 
programs); 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2019) (regulating procedures for monitoring com-
pliance); 12 C.F.R. § 44.20(a), (c) (2019) (regulating requirements and enhanced 
requirements for bank compliance programs); 12 C.F.R. § 44 app. B (2019) (reg-
ulating enhanced minimum standards for compliance programs). 
 58. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -3 
(2012) (regulating prohibited foreign trade practices).  
 59. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 789 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012)) (regulating management assessment of in-
ternal controls); Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Re-
porting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Ex-
change Act Release Nos. 33-8,238, 34-47,986 (effective Aug. 14, 2003), https:// 
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm [https://perma.cc/JU8C-AUJ2] (same). 
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model compliance program guidelines for clinical laboratories.60 
Thus, sometimes compliance is required by statutes and regula-
tions. However, we are unaware of cases where the mandated 
features of a compliance program include, specifically, the adop-
tion of a board-level compliance committee. 
2. Effective Compliance Programs 
An effective compliance program, in theory, would be one 
that minimizes the sum of the costs of misconduct and the costs 
of avoiding and detecting such misconduct.61 In practice, compa-
nies can and are encouraged to use a variety of techniques to 
evaluate the effectiveness of compliance efforts, ranging from in-
ternal audits and data analytics, to employee surveys and exter-
nal assessments. There is little consensus as to how compliance 
should be achieved.62 
In some industry surveys, large numbers of companies, in a 
Lake Wobegon fashion, view their compliance as “well above av-
erage relative to . . . their peers.”63 Yet despite much exhorta-
tion, especially from professional consultants who offer to assist 
in designing compliance programs, relatively little is known 
about what these compliance programs actually entail and how 
their quality should be assessed.64 When industry participants 
speak of “effective compliance programs,” they may refer to pro-
grams that meet the expectations of the authorities. Although 
 
 60. See Publication of the OIG Model Compliance Plan for Clinical Labora-
tories, 62 Fed. Reg. 9435 (1997). 
 61. Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Pro-
grams, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MIS-
DEALING 247 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018) (exploring the economic meaning of ef-
fective compliance programs). 
 62. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 933, 933 (2017) (introducing different opinions); Tom R. Tyler, Reducing 
Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 267, 291 (2014) 
(calling for “an attempt to develop empirically based policies and practices 
through a neutral and independent review of what works”). 
 63. See, e.g., PWC, 2018 STATE OF COMPLIANCE STUDY 7, https://www.pwc 
.com/sk/en/assets/PDFs/2018-state-of-compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MZJ 
-ZPZV] (reporting that 85% of respondent corporations rated their compliance 
as well above average relative to their peers). 
 64. See Langevoort, supra note 62, at 933 (questioning about compliance 
programs). A study of federal DPAs from 2001 through 2012 found that less 
than a quarter of them (22% or 55 of 255 agreements) actually required the 
company to assess how effectively its compliance program was functioning. See 
GARRETT, supra note 8, at 75 (presenting the study result). 
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meeting these requirements is deemed by the authorities to be 
“effective,” it does not necessarily follow that they are actually 
effective in the sense of minimizing the sum of the costs of mis-
conduct and the costs of avoiding and detecting such miscon-
duct.65  
In light of these difficulties, and the fact that firms’ compli-
ance activity is primarily incentivized by the prospect of (waiv-
ing) regulatory sanctions, we focus here on the structure of effec-
tive compliance programs as envisaged by official guidance. 
While the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines contain a de-
tailed set of requirements for a compliance program to count for 
sentencing credit, they have actually seen little direct applica-
tion in recent years. For example, in the fiscal years 2009 
through 2012, the U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that no 
companies received sentencing credit for having an effective 
compliance program.66 Rather, it seems that the primary chan-
nel through which compliance delivers a discount to firms has 
shifted to prosecutors rewarding effective compliance with leni-
ency through the use of DPAs.67 When a DPA is entered into, the 
firm is not formally prosecuted and is never sentenced under the 
Guidelines.68  
How, then, do compliance programs get taken into account 
in the prosecution decision? Public statements about compliance 
 
 65. For critiques of the current approach, see, for example, Todd Haugh, 
The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215 (2017) (criti-
cizing approaching compliance through a criminal law lens); Miriam Hechler 
Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009) (proposing a 
new regime to change the current model); and compare with Daniel C. Richman, 
Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 277 (2014) (indicating 
that the practice of deferred prosecution agreements is only a few decades old 
and so it may be too soon to evaluate the long-term impact). 
 66. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, TABLE 54: ORGANIZATIONS 
SENTENCED UNDER CHAPTER EIGHT: CULPABILITY FACTORS (2009–2012), 
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook/archive [https://perma.cc/VR2F 
-4N23].  
 67. The rise of DPAs as the preferred technique for prosecutors dealing 
with large public corporate defendants in the United States has been well-doc-
umented. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 8, at 82 (presenting the chart showing 
dealings under DPAs). 
 68. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-28.200 (“In certain 
instances, it may be appropriate to resolve a corporate criminal case by means 
other than indictment . . . . DPAs], for example, occupy an important middle 
ground between declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a corpo-
ration.”).  
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from the DOJ had in the past been quite vague. Take this state-
ment: 
The Department has no formulaic requirements regarding corporate 
compliance programs. The fundamental questions any prosecutor 
should ask are: Is the corporation’s compliance program well designed? 
Is the program being applied earnestly and in good faith? Does the cor-
poration’s compliance program work?69 
The DOJ guidelines then state that prosecutors should try to as-
sess whether the program is just a “paper program,” and should 
consider “whether the corporation has provided for a staff suffi-
cient to audit, document, analyze, and utilize the results of the 
corporation’s compliance efforts.”70  
Further information about what “effective” compliance 
means may potentially be found in the terms of individual DPAs 
negotiated with firms, which are typically made public. Over 
time, the contours of compliance initiatives disclosed in DPAs 
can become an additional source—beyond sentencing guidelines, 
statutes, and regulations—of incentives to involve the board in 
compliance, revealing at a granular level what prosecutors con-
sider important. Federal prosecutors have over the past fifteen 
years taken the lead in seeking compliance changes in target 
firms; the DOJ adopted some of the first compliance-focused en-
forcement guidelines; prosecutors pushed for adoption of corpo-
rate monitors to oversee compliance, and have often stated that 
a central goal of a corporate prosecution is not just to punish cor-
porate crime but also to rehabilitate firms.  
Towards the end of the Obama Administration, the DOJ 
hired a Compliance Counsel Expert, who issued guidance to add 
more rigor to the scrutiny of corporate compliance. While that 
Expert left early in the Trump Administration, the guidance re-
mains in effect, albeit with some statements from the DOJ that 
compliance in the form of independent monitor supervision 
should be used more selectively.71 The DOJ’s Criminal Fraud 
 
 69. Id. § 9-28.800. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Assistant Attorney General Brian A. Benczkowski, Dep’t of Justice, Re-
marks at N.Y.U. School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforce-
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Section published this guidance in 2017,72 with an updated ver-
sion in April 2019,73 titled “Evaluation of Corporate Compliance 
Programs.” The guidance contains a list of “common questions” 
and “sample topics” but not any definitive guide, emphasizing 
prosecutors must make an “individualized determination” in 
each case.74 
3. The Compliance Function Within a Firm 
Traditionally, compliance functions were supervised by a 
company’s General Counsel, but today, many firms designate at 
least some types of ethical and legal compliance as separate from 
the General Counsel.75 There is no consensus amongst schol-
ars—nor in industry—on the merits of separating the compli-
ance function(s) from those centered in the General Counsel’s of-
fice.76 One argument for an independent compliance function is 
that locating compliance outside of management, apart from the 
CEO and General Counsel, and reporting to the organization’s 
board, can assure an independent and outside perspective.77 An-
other is that instilling an effective culture of compliance may ne-
cessitate a focus that is not strictly legalistic but rather that 
seeks to foster ethical behavior in employees.78 In smaller and 
non-public companies, resource constraints may force both roles 
to be located in the same office and person. In large and public 
 
 72. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017, supra note 
13. 
 73. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra note 
13. 
 74. Id. at 1–2. 
 75. See, e.g., Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why 
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 101 
(2014) (indicating that a compliance professional is not necessarily a legal pro-
fessional). 
 76. See Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Prelim-
inary Findings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 469 
(2008) (raising questions “about the role of in-house counsel in implementing 
and overseeing compliance mechanisms inside the corporation”). 
 77. Cf. id. at 471 (indicating that in-house lawyers had compromised their 
independence by moving inside). 
 78. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HODGES & RUTH STEINHOLTZ, ETHICAL BUSI-
NESS PRACTICE AND REGULATION: A BEHAVIOURAL AND VALUES-BASED AP-
PROACH TO COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 214–36 (2017) (proposing an ethi-
cal approach to compliance). 
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companies, though, there is a debate about what structure is 
preferable.79 
Obviously, in whichever department or reporting line it is 
located, the compliance function should be adequately re-
sourced—in this respect, the size of the firm and the nature of 
the risks assessed in relation to compliance will be determina-
tive.80 The “resourcing” of compliance should be understood to 
include not only the direct costs of employing compliance staff 
and training employees regarding compliance, but also the indi-
rect costs of integrating the program into the firm’s business 
structure. Done properly, this entails careful assessment of the 
incentives created by aspects of the firm’s business model, espe-
cially performance targets set for employees.81 Managers seek-
ing to improve performance are often drawn to implementing 
performance targets for employees that focus on metrics like 
sales, costs, or task completion, because these metrics are read-
ily measurable and have an obvious link to the firm’s perfor-
mance. However, the pursuit of such metrics to the exclusion of 
other considerations has potential to trigger failures in other 
harder-to-measure and/or less immediately financially relevant 
aspects of performance, such as safety measures or compliance 
with law.82 While most employees have natural instincts to be 
 
 79. See Michael W. Peregrine, Seeking Clarity at the Crossroads of Legal 
and Compliance, CORP. COUNS. (Sept. 18, 2014), https://s3-us-east-2 
.amazonaws.com/mwe.media/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/05161327/cc091814 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9TH-E5YT] (discussing the debate). Compare DeSte-
fano, supra note 75, at 155 (“Departmentalizing compliance from legal so as to 
remove general counsel oversight of compliance may not necessarily be in the 
public’s best interest.”), with Rostain, supra note 76, at 490 (suggesting “the 
general counsel may be well positioned to play a significant gatekeeping role in 
their companies”).  
 80. The experience and qualifications of the Chief Compliance Officer 
(CCO) may expect to be scrutinized. An ex post review may scrutinize whether 
the compliance department ever asked for additional resources and the re-
sponses received from management. 
 81. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra 13, at 
13 (“Has the company considered the implications of its incentives and rewards 
on compliance? How does the company incentivize compliance and ethical be-
havior? Have there been specific examples of actions taken (e.g., promotions or 
awards denied) as a result of compliance and ethics considerations? Who deter-
mines the compensation, including bonuses, as well as discipline and promotion 
of compliance personnel?”). 
 82. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Miscon-
duct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687, 702–
  
1212 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1191 
 
concerned with these issues, internal ethical or safety concerns 
can be crowded out by sufficiently strong financial incentives.83 
Taking full account of the compliance implications of these vari-
ables may necessitate significant modifications, dulling the per-
formance impact of the incentive schemes. As a consequence, ef-
fective compliance can involve substantial indirect costs, at least 
in the short run. 
In Part I.A, we have seen that firms are given incentives by 
regulators and prosecutors to establish internal compliance pro-
grams. Prosecutors give guidance on what they look for in an 
“effective” compliance program. Fully implementing this may be 
costly for firms. Although firms extol the virtues of their compli-
ance programs, relatively little is known about their actual suc-
cess in reducing the incidence of misconduct. 
B. BOARD OVERSIGHT OF COMPLIANCE 
Contemporaneously with the growth of compliance, it has 
become clear that corporate boards are expected to engage in 
oversight of these programs. These expectations have two dis-
tinct sources. First, the prosecution and sentencing guidelines 
discussed in Part I.A, insofar as they pertain specifically to the 
role of the board, which we review in Part I.B.1. Second, devel-
opments in directors’ corporate law fiduciary duties, which we 
review in Part I.B.2. We then discuss in Part I.B.3 how board 
oversight of compliance may entail mediating conflict between 
senior executives and the firms’ compliance function.   
1. Expectations of the Board from Prosecutors 
As described in Part I.A.2, leniency in prosecution and sen-
tencing decisions has been a primary impetus for corporate com-
pliance programs. The relevant guidance sets expectations spe-
cifically about the role of the board in overseeing compliance 
programs. Consider first the organizational sentencing guide-
lines, which inform prosecution decision-making, in addition to 
judicial sentencing. These were amended in 2010 to highlight 
 
04 (1997) (noting the significance of employee compensation and promotion pol-
icies for efficacy of compliance programs).  
 83. See Sverre Grepperud & Pal Andreas Pedersen, Crowding Effects and 
Work Ethics, 20 LABOUR 125 (2006) (analyzing effects of monetary rewards on 
intrinsic motivation).  
  
2020] BOARD COMPLIANCE 1213 
 
board responsibility.84 Section 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) now requires the 
board to “be knowledgeable about the content and operation of 
the compliance and ethics program and . . . exercise reasonable 
oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness 
of the compliance and ethics program.”85 
The Guidelines go on to state that there should be a direct 
reporting obligation from the Compliance Officer to the board or 
a board committee.86 Corporations may receive mitigation if per-
sons with operational responsibility for the compliance and eth-
ics program “have direct reporting obligations to the governing 
authority or an appropriate subgroup thereof (e.g., an audit com-
mittee of the board of directors)” and that program detected and 
reported the misconduct.87 The compliance personnel “shall be 
given adequate resources, appropriate authority, and direct ac-
cess to the governing authority or an appropriate subgroup of the 
governing authority.”88 Thus, the Guidelines reward board in-
volvement in compliance. 
Turning to guidance from prosecutors, the DOJ’s Evaluation 
of Corporate Compliance Programs, in the section titled “Over-
sight,” emphasizes the role of the board.89 It asks: “What compli-
ance expertise has been available on the board of directors?”90 It 
then asks: “Have the board of directors and/or external auditors 
held executive or private sessions with the compliance and con-
trol functions? What types of information have the board of di-
rectors and senior management examined in their exercise of 
 
 84. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12, ch. 8. 
 85. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A). Although the Guidelines refer specifically to a “gov-
erning authority,” this is taken to mean the board, if the company has one. Id. 
§ 8B2.1 cmt. 1 (“‘Governing authority’ means the [sic] (A) the Board of Directors; 
or (B) if the organization does not have a Board of Directors, the highest-level 
governing body of the organization.”). 
 86. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (“Specific individual(s) within the organization shall 
be delegated day-to-day operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics 
program. Individual(s) with operational responsibility shall report periodically 
to high-level personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, or an 
appropriate subgroup of the governing authority, on the effectiveness of the 
compliance and ethics program.”). 
 87. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(3)(C)(i)–(iii). 
 88. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C). 
 89. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017, supra note 
13. 
 90. Id. 
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oversight in the area in which the misconduct occurred?”91 The 
DOJ’s Evaluation document then goes on to ask, in the section 
headed “Autonomy”: “Have the compliance and relevant control 
functions had direct reporting lines to anyone on the board of 
directors? How often do they meet with the board of directors? 
Are members of the senior management present for these meet-
ings?”92 
2. Compliance and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 
As a matter of state organizational law, directors have a fi-
duciary duty to engage in some level of compliance oversight.93 
The narrowest conception is a duty to act when it comes to direc-
tors’ attention that there is, or may be, misconduct taking place; 
such actual knowledge then triggers a duty to investigate and 
take appropriate consequent steps.94 The necessary investiga-
tion and subsequent action demanded will be a function of the 
extent of the evidence of the misconduct available to the direc-
tors and the seriousness of the consequences of potential miscon-
duct.95 Notice, though, that the extent of this ex post duty de-
pends crucially on the quality of the information coming to the 
board.96 To what extent does the board have a positive duty to 
ensure an upward flow of information regarding compliance? 
Since the well-known 1996 Delaware Chancery Court opin-
ion in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,97 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 3. 
 93. See, e.g., Reiter v. Fairbank, C.A. No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823, at 
*1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016). 
 94. See In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 
1074, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 
2006)); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); Okla. 
Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, C.A. No. 12151-VCG, 2017 WL 
6452240, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017); Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension 
Tr. Fund v. Jacobs, C.A. No. 10872-VCMR, 2016 WL 4076369, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 1, 2016) (citing Stone, 911 A.2d at 370); In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative 
& Class Action Litig., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *22 n.157 (Del. 
Ch. May 31, 2011) (citing Stone, 911 A.2d at 370). 
 95. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12, 
§ 8C2.5(f).  
 96. See cases cited supra note 94. 
 97. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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directors have also been expected to ensure some system of over-
sight is implemented in the first place. As Chancellor Allen ex-
plained: 
[I]t would, in my opinion, be a mistake to conclude that . . . corporate 
boards may satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concern-
ing the corporation, without assuring themselves that information and 
reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably de-
signed to provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, 
accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, 
each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the 
corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance.98 
However, the duty is merely one of good faith, failure to meet 
which would require “a sustained or systematic failure of the 
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt 
to assure a reasonable information and reporting system 
exi[s]ts[.]”99 Or, as it was subsequently put by the Delaware Su-
preme Court in Stone v. Ritter: “(a) the directors utterly failed to 
implement any reporting or information system or controls; or 
(b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously 
failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling them-
selves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their 
attention.”100  
Thus, the Delaware caselaw is as unspecific and general as 
much of the guidance that comes through both DOJ guidelines 
and enforcement. Compliance matters and complete failures of 
the board to oversee compliance will have grave consequences. 
But what consists in effective or sound compliance—or its over-
sight—is left unstated.101 
 
 98. Id. at 970. 
 99. Id. at 971. 
 100. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 101. See Armour et al., supra note 31, at 45–47. Recent cases suggest the 
emergence of an affirmative duty of board-level compliance oversight where the 
firm is subject to a comprehensive regulatory scheme applicable to an essential 
feature of its business, for example, Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 
2019) (concerning food safety regulation for core product), or where the firm is 
subject to a specific compliance decree entered into to resolve a prior regulatory 
failure, for example, In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. 220 Litig., Consolidated C.A. No. 
2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL 2320842, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019) (declaring that 
where a board fails to oversee compliance with a consent decree, “Delaware 
courts traditionally have viewed stockholder allegations that a board failed to 
oversee the company’s obligation to comply with positive law, or positive regu-
latory mandates, more favorably in the Caremark paradigm than allegations 
  
1216 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1191 
 
3. Boards’ Role in Mediating Conflict over Compliance  
Apart from the priorities placed on compliance by enforcers, 
boards themselves have conflicting incentives regarding the 
compliance function. In particular, conflicts may emerge be-
tween immediate financial considerations prioritized by manag-
ers and the objectives of effective compliance. Executive compen-
sation is typically tightly linked to a firm’s stock price so as to 
encourage focus on shareholder value.102 This can create conflict 
over the establishment of a compliance program, and over how 
such a program is run.103 Assuming that the penalties for regu-
latory violations are set so as to give shareholders appropriate 
incentives to internalize social costs, such conflict is a corporate 
governance problem. That is, managers may fail to take actions 
to minimize expected penalties that would be in the interests of 
shareholders. 
To see how such costs could emerge, note that although es-
tablishing a compliance program can reduce a firm’s expected 
penalties, doing so sends a compound signal to investors. It sig-
nals both: (1) that the firm is taking compliance seriously (a good 
thing for investors); and (2) that the firm considers it is appro-
priate to take compliance seriously. This second component may 
have a negative impact on the stock price.104 All other things 
equal, whether the firm thinks it is appropriate to invest in com-
pliance is a function of the likelihood of enforcement.105 Conse-
quently, a firm that discloses a compliance program signals that 
it anticipates it has a relatively high chance of attracting en-
forcement.106 Although the fact that the firm is taking compli-
ance seriously is good news for investors, this can only ever re-
duce, but not eliminate, expected penalties:107 the net effect of 
 
that a board failed to oversee the company’s efforts generally to avoid business 
risk”).  
 102. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, CEO Pay and Corporate Governance in the 
U.S.: Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, 25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 15 (2013). 
 103. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 33, at 354–57; Armour et al., supra note 
31, at 20–31. 
 104. See Armour et al., supra note 31, at 4. 
 105. See, e.g., id. at 13–14. 
 106. Id. at 29–30. 
 107. The presence of an effective compliance program can reduce a firm’s 
penalty by between sixty to eighty percent. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 8C2.5(f), 8C2.6. 
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the signal is therefore likely to be negative. Consequently, man-
agers seeking to maximize the stock price likely prefer not to dis-
close details of a firm’s compliance activities.108 Consistent with 
this proposition, firms do not voluntarily disclose any meaning-
ful information about their compliance activity.109  
Conflicts are also likely to emerge in the running of a com-
pliance program. If misconduct is detected, a manager believing 
there to be a low probability of enforcement may seek to cover up 
the misconduct, so as to avoid an adverse impact on the stock 
price.110 Chief Compliance Officers may find themselves side-
lined or even fired by CEOs anxious to avoid this sort of revela-
tion. The fear of such treatment will undermine the efficacy of a 
compliance program, and consequently the DOJ’s guidance now 
provides that the compliance team should enjoy autonomy from 
management, facilitated by a direct reporting channel to the 
board.111  
The board is increasingly viewed as a forum for resolving 
such conflicts.112 The DOJ’s memorandum and other guidance 
regarding effective compliance provide that responsibility for in-
ternal oversight and monitoring of compliance programs should 
lie with the board of directors, usually through a committee of 
independent directors—either the audit committee or, where es-
tablished, a separate compliance committee.113 Boards are ex-
 
 108. See id.; Armour et al., supra note 31, at 5.  
 109. Griffith, supra note 28, at 2138–39. Our own searches of EDGAR filings 
turned up no meaningful information about corporate compliance activity. 
 110. See Armour et al., supra note 31, at 12 n.50. 
 111. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra note 
13, at 11 (“Do the compliance and relevant control functions have direct report-
ing lines to anyone on the board of directors and/or audit committee? How often 
do they meet with directors?”). 
 112. See, e.g., Martin Lipton et al., Risk Management and the Board of Di-
rectors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/20/risk-management-and-the-board 
-of-directors-5/ [https://perma.cc/DS5R-CGUR] (describing the board’s oversight 
role). 
 113. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017, supra note 
13, at 2 (“Oversight–What compliance expertise has been available on the board 
of directors? Have the board of directors and/or external auditors held executive 
or private sessions with the compliance and control functions? What types of 
information have the board of directors and senior management examined in 
their exercise of oversight in the area in which the misconduct occurred?”); see 
also ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF HIGH-
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pected to understand the goals and operation of their firm’s com-
pliance function, which should be supported by regular reporting 
and a clear flow of information.114 Moreover, it is increasingly 
thought that a direct channel of reporting from compliance to the 
board is a means of fostering not only autonomy within the com-
pliance program but also an open upward transmission of infor-
mation.115 The DOJ guidance cites to such communication as rel-
evant both to oversight and autonomy.116 
The board’s role in managing conflict between the firm’s 
compliance function and other senior executives lies outside tra-
ditional accounts of corporate governance.117 Most accounts see 
the board’s role as being to monitor the executives’ management 
of the company in the interests of shareholders, with a view to 
reducing agency costs.118 To this end, much emphasis is placed 
on the need for directors to be independent of executives, to but-
tress against conflicts of interest.119 In overseeing compliance, 
the boards are monitoring the executives’ resourcing and imple-
mentation of the firm’s compliance program and the manage-
ment of conflicts between compliance needs and the pursuit of 
strategic goals.120 Because of the financial implications of com-
pliance, resolving such conflicts in accordance with regulatory 
guidance regarding best practice is ultimately in the interests of 
shareholders.  
C. BOARD STRUCTURE AND COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT 
Neither the DOJ guidance nor corporate law specifies the 
process through which the board should exercise compliance 
 
QUALITY ETHICS & COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: REPORT OF ECI’S BLUE RIBBON 
PANEL 19 (2016) (“The E[thics &] C[ompliance] structure ensures independence 
and regular access to the board and/or the audit committee.”). 
 114. See, e.g., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017, su-
pra note 13, at 2–3. 
 115. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra note 
13, at 10. 
 116. Id. at 4 (“Another hallmark of a well-designed compliance program is 
appropriately tailored training and communications.”). 
 117. Griffith, supra note 28, at 2081. 
 118. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECO-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 91–93 (1991); John Armour et al., The 
Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 41, 50 (3d ed. 2017). 
 119. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 118, at 62–67. 
 120. See, e.g., id. 
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oversight.121 But the choice of process may matter. In Part I.C.1, 
we introduce two distinct ways in which a board can handle com-
pliance oversight: first, by adding compliance oversight to the 
remit of its existing audit committee, or second, by establishing 
a distinct compliance committee. In Part I.C.2, we suggest that 
the choice between these alternatives is not simply a cosmetic 
matter, but may affect both the intensity of compliance oversight 
and the cost to the company. In Part I.C.3, we support this view 
with evidence about the way in which AC and CC charters allo-
cate compliance oversight tasks. In Part I.C.4, we present case 
studies of boards that have established CCs.  
1. Compliance Oversight and Board Committees 
Because public companies are required to establish an AC, 
which has responsibility for internal financial controls,122 many 
firms simply append compliance to the AC’s terms of reference. 
Both audit and compliance oversight functions involve review of 
executives’ implementation of a system of controls—financial 
controls or a compliance program, respectively—and a role as ar-
biter of first instance of any conflicts that arise in relation to ex-
ecutives’ conduct and the system of controls or compliance.123  
The core remit of the AC is essentially to oversee the com-
pany’s relationship with its auditors.124 This makes ACs an im-
portant component in the Sarbanes-Oxley regime for oversight 
of internal financial controls. In addition to their central function 
of ensuring integrity of the choice of auditor and handling the 
periodic review by the auditor of firm financial information, ACs 
also became responsible for managing the potential conflict cre-
ated where internal irregularities came to light, or were alleged 
by employees, where management were implicated or unwilling 
to act. In order to ensure their independence in performing this 
role, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires U.S. public 
 
 121. See, e.g., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, 
supra note 13; cases cited supra note 101. 
 122. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities 
Act of 1933 Release No. 33-8220 (Apr. 9, 2003).  
 123. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Con-
trols to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 273–74 (2004).  
 124. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 2, 116 Stat. 745, 747 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7220 (2012)).  
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companies to have audit committees staffed entirely by inde-
pendent directors.125 
It is easy to see that the AC’s function could lend itself to 
becoming the channel through which the board exercises compli-
ance oversight. Both ACs and CCs involve oversight of execu-
tives’ implementation of a system of controls—financial controls 
or a compliance program, respectively—and a role as arbiter of 
first instance of any conflicts that arise in relation to executives’ 
conduct and the system of controls or compliance.126 For this rea-
son, many companies simply task their AC with oversight of the 
firm’s compliance programs in general, as well as the core, and 
more specific, role of oversight of financial controls.127  
On the other hand, some firms have established distinct 
CCs, likewise composed of independent directors. 128  When 
staffed with different personnel from the AC, this opens up 
greater bandwidth for engagement, permits the selection of in-
dividuals with different expertise, and facilitates any appropri-
ate difference in ethos with respect to decision-making. Of 
course, such division results in loss of potential complementari-
ties from joint oversight of financial and non-financial compli-
ance, making it desirable for there to be at least some overlap in 
membership. Another approach, which preserves complementa-
rities, is to retitle the AC as the “Audit and Compliance Commit-
tee,” reflecting a difference in emphasis as respects expertise and 
role.129  
2. Board Time as a Scarce Resource 
We have seen that while some boards deal with compliance 
oversight by adding it to the list of the AC’s responsibilities, oth-
ers choose to establish a separate CC to handle compliance. 
What difference does it make whether a board routes compliance 
 
 125. Id. § 301. 
 126. See Cunningham, supra note 123, at 273–74. 
 127. See id. at 301–06 (describing certain companies’ implementation of in-
ternal auditing controls).  
 128. For examples, see infra Part I.C.3. 
 129. See Deloitte, Boards: Understand the Rules for Ethics and Compliance 
Oversight, WALL STREET J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (May 2, 2018), https:// 
deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2018/05/02/boards-understand-the-rules 
-for-ethics-and-compliance-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/TY7Q-DEPF] (noting 
also that “NYSE-listed companies are required to have the audit committee 
oversee legal and regulatory compliance”). 
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oversight through its AC or sets up a new CC? A skeptic might 
see this as a merely cosmetic exercise. However, we believe there 
are good reasons for thinking that the difference is material, 
both in terms of the intensity of the oversight, and the cost to the 
company.  
Compliance officers and independent directors with whom 
we spoke highlighted the real time commitment that arises from 
the creation of a new committee. It generates another set of 
meetings, documents to review, evaluative reports to write, all 
in addition to the other responsibilities of the board members. 
Independent director time is a scarce resource. Most public com-
panies constrain their total board size, consistent with empirical 
studies reporting that larger boards have reduced efficacy.130 At 
the same time, to be classed as “independent,” a director must 
not have an employment relationship with their company, mean-
ing that they are of necessity a part-timer.131 This means that 
time allocated to membership of a CC must be subtracted from 
some other aspect of board functioning. The opportunity cost can 
be very high. These industry professionals suggested that firms 
would typically only reshape their board structure and create 
compliance committees based on a strong external shock, like a 
high-profile scandal or enforcement action. Otherwise, a firm 
would prefer to focus on compliance through existing internal 
governance structures.  
3. Evidence on Compliance Oversight Intensity from 
Committee Charters 
It appears that where a CC is established, oversight of com-
pliance is likely to be pursued more vigorously than where this 
is simply added to the AC’s mandate. Reflecting their tighter fo-
cus, CC charters are more likely to contain specific deliverables 
regarding the compliance oversight process. For example, CCs 
are often tasked with periodic review of internal Codes of Con-
duct and the functioning of the company’s compliance pro-
gram.132 In contrast, a typical audit committee will be expected 
 
 130. Joann S. Lublin, Small Boards Get Bigger Returns, WALL STREET J. 
(Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/smaller-boards-get-bigger 
-returns-1409078628 [https://perma.cc/Q63U-LHUC]. 
 131. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 2, 116 Stat. 745, 
751 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7220 (2012)). 
 132. See, e.g., CIGNA, COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE CHARTER (2019); GOLDMAN 
SACHS BDC, INC., COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE CHARTER (2013); GOODYEAR TIRE 
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to perform oversight functions mainly regarding financial mat-
ters.133  This means that a CC is likely to establish a much 
clearer, and more tightly controlled, reporting channel to the 
Board from the company’s compliance function than would be 
the case with an audit committee beyond financial matters. Both 
CC and AC mandates will typically confer the power to retain 
legal and other external experts as necessary to assist the com-
mittee.134 Some CC mandates also confer power to initiate and 
conduct internal investigations into compliance,135 although this 
is by no means universal.136  
To lend context to our discussion of the way in which boards 
allocate compliance oversight responsibility to their committees, 
we conclude this Part with a discussion of three case studies of 
firms that have chosen to establish distinct CCs. 
4. Case Studies 
In reflecting on the role of compliance committees, it is help-
ful to consider some case studies in which a CC has played an 
active role. In each case, we draw on SEC filings and news re-
ports to understand what the committee did, and how it came to 
be formed.  
LendingClub. The board of peer-to-peer lender LendingClub 
probably lies at the opposite end of the compliance engagement 
spectrum from the passive Wells Fargo board with which this 
Article began. In 2016, following an internal review, an error of 
 
& RUBBER CO., COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPLIANCE 
CHARTER (2017); PG&E CORP., COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE 
CHARTER 2 (2019); QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC., QUALITY, SAFETY & COMPLIANCE 
COMMITTEE CHARTER (2018); SW. AIRLINES CO., SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE 
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE CHARTER (2019) (on file with authors). 
 133. See, e.g., MERCK, AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARTER ¶¶ 6–7, 11 (2019), https:// 
www.merck.com/about/leadership/board-of-directors/Charter%20-%20Audit 
%20Committee%20-%20May%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DVQ-CFRR]. 
 134. CIGNA, supra note 132, at 2; GOLDMAN SACHS BDC, INC., supra note 
132, at 3; GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., supra note 132, at 2; PG&E CORP., 
supra note 132, at 4; QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC., supra note 132, at 3; cf. SW. 
AIRLINES CO., supra note 132, at 2 (specifying the committee may consult with 
outside counsel).  
 135. CIGNA, supra note 132, at 2; QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC., supra note 132, 
at 2. 
 136. See, e.g., GOLDMAN SACHS BDC, INC., supra note 132; GOODYEAR TIRE 
& RUBBER CO., supra note 132; PG&E CORP., supra note 132 (making no men-
tion of investigations); SW. AIRLINES CO., supra note 132, at 2 (“It is not the 
Committee’s responsibility to conduct investigations . . . .”). 
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$22 million in loan sales was brought to the attention of the 
LendingClub board.137 The board’s response was “swift and deci-
sive,” including procuring the prompt resignation of the com-
pany’s founder-CEO.138 The board then assigned investigation of 
what had gone wrong to a newly-formed board committee of in-
dependent directors, which retained outside counsel.139 This in-
vestigation uncovered additional problems, for which the board 
decided promptly to reimburse investors for approximately $1 
million of losses, as well as calling for the “termination or resig-
nation of . . . senior managers involved” in the relevant loan 
sales.140 Thus, the LendingClub board took a hands-on and ac-
tive role in responding to a compliance problem, through the in-
stitution of a new committee specifically to handle the investiga-
tion. The fact that the company had “‘promptly self-reported its 
executives’ misconduct following a review initiated by its board 
of directors,” was a relevant factor for the DOJ and SEC in sub-
sequently deciding not to prosecute the firm.141 However, this 
hands-on Board engagement with compliance did not result in 
creation of an on-going compliance committee. 
AIG. An example of a firm adopting a compliance committee 
during an intensive regulatory investigation is AIG, which ulti-
mately paid $1.6 billion to regulators, and created a new board 
compliance committee before settling those actions. 142  In the 
mid-2000s AIG faced prosecution for manipulating its financial 
statement through use of reinsurance to create income.143 Before 
 
 137. Peter Rudegeair, LendingClub CEO Fired Over Faulty Loans, WALL 
STREET J., May 9, 2016. 
 138. LendingClub Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 6, 2016). 
 139. Id. at 5. 
 140. Id.; LendingClub, Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 22, 2016); 
SEC Charges Lending Club Asset Management and Former Executives with 
Misleading Investors and Breaching Fiduciary Duty, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Press Release 2018-223 (Sept. 28, 2018) [hereinafter SEC Press Release], 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-223 [https://perma.cc/6EKZ 
-76CV]. 
 141. SEC Press Release, supra note 140. 
 142. Daniel Hays, AIG Pays $1.64 Billion To Settle Fraud Charges with 




 143. See Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & AIG Financial 
Products Corp. (Nov. 30, 2004), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate 
-prosecution-registry/agreements/aig-fp.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TJJ-WZ97]. 
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entering into a non-prosecution agreement, it created two board 
committees to focus on compliance and regulation. 144  One of 
those committees actually played a role in resolving the enforce-
ment matter. The new Regulatory, Compliance and Legal Com-
mittee was led by Stephen L. Hammerman, a retired New York 
City deputy police commissioner, which was “helping AIG exec-
utives negotiate a possible settlement with New York State At-
torney General Eliot Spitzer and prepare a global compliance 
program.”145 The creation of the new committee may have been 
a vehicle for adding board members who could assist AIG with 
such negotiations. 
Las Vegas Sands. Our third case study illustrates the estab-
lishment of a compliance committee as a response to prosecutors’ 
requests. In 2013, Las Vegas Sands entered a non-prosecution 
agreement with the DOJ for Bank Secrecy Act violations, under 
the terms of which the company was required to create a compli-
ance committee.146 The Compliance Committee Charter for Las 
Vegas Sands Corp. specifies that the three directors on the com-
mittee shall all be independent directors. 147  That committee 
meets at least four times a year, but with similar oversight re-
sponsibilities (although a specified focus on gaming law compli-
ance and anti-corruption and money laundering law).148 When 
Las Vegas Sands was prosecuted once more, this time for FCPA 
violations, it settled the matter with another non-prosecution 
agreement in 2017, which credited the firm for having a board-
level compliance committee (it had “established a new Board of 
Directors Compliance Committee.”).149   
 
 144. AIG Restructures Its Executive Governance, Adds 2 Outside Directors to 
Board, INS. J. (Apr. 21, 2005), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ 
national/2005/04/21/54166.htm [https://perma.cc/EXQ7-DQ6D].  
 145. Joann S. Lublin, Compliance Panels Slowly Take Hold, WALL STREET 
J. (Jan. 9, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113676266099241116 [https:// 
perma.cc/3WHU-AUW9]. 
 146. See Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Attorney’s Office & Las Vegas 
Sands Corp. (Aug. 26, 2013), https://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate 
-prosecution-registry/agreements/Las-Vegas-Sands-Corp-NPA.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/L4Y3-HJXJ]. 




 148. Id. 
 149. See Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Section, 
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In some of these cases, the CC was established during a pe-
riod of very high internal focus on compliance, but in others, like 
in the LendingClub example, no such committee was created. In 
none of those cases in which a CC was established, was the rele-
vant committee dissolved after the investigations had closed. 
This evidence suggests that choosing to oversee compliance 
through a separate committee is more than a cosmetic matter for 
a Board, but something that carries real costs and plausibly has 
an impact on the intensity of oversight.  
In Part I.A, we outlined how and why regulators and prose-
cutors give firms incentives to establish internal compliance pro-
grams. We saw in Part I.B that both prosecutorial guidance and 
corporate law fiduciary duties now envisage a role for boards 
specifically in overseeing such internal compliance programs, 
and that this may entail mediating conflict between senior exec-
utives and such programs. In Part I.C, we considered particular 
ways in which boards may perform their compliance oversight 
function, comparing the adoption of a stand-alone CC with the 
addition of compliance oversight to the AC’s list of duties. The 
choice between these is not dictated either by prosecutorial guid-
ance or by fiduciary duties. While establishing a CC seems likely 
to permit more intense compliance oversight, it is also likely to 
be more costly for boards to establish and staff. In Part II, we 
present our empirical findings about the extent of CC adoption 
by public companies, and the attributes of companies most likely 
to adopt them.  
II.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BOARD COMPLIANCE   
In this Part, we present novel empirical data and analysis 
to help understand how and why corporate boards respond to the 
challenge of compliance oversight. Despite the recent emphasis 
on the board’s role in corporate compliance, to our surprise we 
find that the vast majority (nearly 94%) of U.S. public companies 
do not have compliance committees at the board level. That said, 
the number of public companies that do have such committees is 
slowly increasing, and we find higher rates of adoption in certain 
highly regulated industries. Moreover, creation of a compliance 
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committee is more likely among firms with a history of prosecu-
tion and with outside directors who previously served on other 
boards that had compliance committees. In Subpart A, we sum-
marize the prior literature on corporate compliance activities, 
then describe the sources of our data, provide an overview of 
these data, including by detailing our results in a time trend. In 
Subpart B, we examine to what degree board compliance com-
mittees are required, either by the SEC or in prosecution agree-
ments. In Subpart C, we ask why a company might create a CC, 
presenting results concerning cases in which CC adoption is vol-
untary. In Subpart D, we present results concerning the types of 
companies in which boards adopt CC’s. 
A. NEW DATA ON BOARD COMPLIANCE  
1. Prior Literature  
There is a general dearth of academic empirical literature 
on corporate compliance activities. The central challenge in iden-
tifying compliance investment is that firms generally do not dis-
close details about their compliance programs.150 To understand 
why not, note first that securities laws do not mandate disclosure 
of compliance expenditure.151 Moreover, managers and directors 
have no incentive to volunteer this information.152 This is be-
cause disclosing an investment in compliance may be taken as a 
signal that the firm considers the risk of malfeasance sufficient 
to make its compliance investment worthwhile and feels obliged 
to provide notice of that risk to its shareholders.153 Because even 
the most effective compliance program cannot entirely deflect 
the costs of prosecution, the stock price may fall. As managers 
and directors are both paid primarily in stock, they are likely to 
prefer to avoid this.154  
 
 150. Griffith, supra note 28. 
 151. Id.  
 152. A well-known justification for mandatory disclosure in securities regu-
lation is that in a purely voluntary disclosure regime, managers will disclose too 
little. The most general reason given is that managers will prefer not to share 
with their competitors information that is a source of competitive advantage. 
See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer 
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999). The incentive 
problem we identify here in relation to compliance investment is more specific, 
and likely more intense, than this general rationale.  
 153. See Armour et al., supra note 31. 
 154. Id. at 22. 
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Firms, however, are required to report the existence of a 
compliance committee. 155  Such “corporate governance” infor-
mation is part of the mandatory disclosure associated with the 
annual proxy solicitation for the election of directors.156 Shortly 
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, public companies came to 
be required to disclose charters of their audit, compensation and 
nomination committees.157 This led to a practice of companies 
disclosing charters of every board committee, presumably to 
avoid any potentially misleading omissions regarding the inter-
pretation of the charters of the three committees for which dis-
closure is mandated. As a result, it is possible to compile a da-
taset of board compliance committees and their charters.158  
Nevertheless, board compliance committees have them-
selves been little studied. The only prior empirical literature 
about board compliance comes in the form of practitioner sur-
veys, typically conducted by large accounting firms. For exam-
ple, PwC’s annual State of Compliance report, a widely-cited 
source for compliance literature,159 stated in 2016 that “20% [of 
companies] have Boards of Directors that formed a separate, 
 
 155. Indeed, we argue below that signal conveyed by adoption of a Compli-
ance Committee—a costly investment in compliance that is subject to manda-
tory disclosure—is a significant explanatory factor for the low adoption rate.  
 156. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2019) (containing Item 407 of Regulation S-K 
referenced by Schedule 14A); id. § 240.14a-101 (2000) (specifying content of 
Schedule 14A and Item 7 (Directors and Executive Officers)). The regulation 
requires disclosure of attendance of directors at board meetings and committee 
meetings, which of course requires identification of all board committees.  
 157. SEC Rules have required disclosure of audit committee charters since 
2000 (originally a triennial obligation) in the firm’s proxy statements. See id. 
§ 240.14a-101, Item 7(e)(3). This was extended to an annual obligation in the 
financial statements in 2003. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(i)(2) (2003). The NYSE 
Listed Company Manual was amended in 2003 to require all NYSE-listed com-
panies to have and disclose audit, compensation, and nomination committee 
charters. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule 
Change and Amendment Relating to Corporate Governance, Release No. 34-
47672, SEC Docket No. SR-NYSE-2002-33 (Apr. 11, 2003). Nomination commit-
tee charter disclosure in proxy statements has also been required by SEC Rules 
since the beginning of 2004. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 7(d)(2)(ii)(A) 
(2004). In 2006, these rules were consolidated into SEC Regulation 407. See 71 
Fed. Reg. 53,254 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.407).  
 158. In most cases, information on a company’s board committees are under 
the “Investor Relations” tab on the company’s website.  
 159. Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance 
into Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285 (2017); Griffith, supra note 
28. 
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stand-alone compliance/ethics committee.” 160  The representa-
tiveness of these figures is, however, questionable when atten-
tion is paid to the survey methodology. PwC states that the sur-
vey was conducted on “more than 800 executives globally,” most 
of whom are compliance professionals in both private and public 
companies.161 Because the report is based on respondents’ volun-
tary return of the survey, there is a concern that the survey re-
sponses were submitted disproportionately from those who work 
at firms that already have a strong focus on compliance. In this 
Article, we seek to assess whether these surveys, and the recent 
literature on the effect of enforcement on compliance practices, 
correctly assert that firms so commonly form such committees at 
the board level. For the largest companies in terms of market 
capitalization, a recent article by EY, another major accounting 
firm, reported that 16% of S&P 500 companies have compliance 
committees based on the companies’ proxy statement filed in 
2018.162 Upon closer examination, this report picks up all com-
mittees that may undertake any compliance function rather 
than committees that are specifically called “compliance commit-
tees.” Using our more restrictive (but still quite inclusive) defi-
nition, we find that the fraction of S&P 500 companies with com-
pliance committees increased from 5.3% to 6.8% over the 2004–
2017 period, a considerably lower fraction.163   
Another strand of prior literature considers the impact of 
criminal prosecutions on board structure. A number of scholars 
have noted the often-extensive scope of the matters negotiated 
with prosecutors as part of a DPA. In addition to large financial 
penalties, DPAs frequently mandate enhancements to existing 
internal compliance programs, cooperation with investigations, 
the appointment of an independent corporate monitor, and, in 
some cases, changes to corporate governance structures.164 Of 
 
 160. PWC, STATE OF COMPLIANCE STUDY 2016: LAYING A STRATEGIC FOUN-
DATION FOR STRONG COMPLIANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 3 (2016), https:// 
www.pwc.se/sv/pdf-reports/state-of-compliance-study-2016.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/FVC8-XGVQ].  
 161. Id., Foreword. 
 162. EY CTR FOR BRD MATTERS, A FRESH LOOK AT BOARD COMMITTEES 
(2018), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-cbm-a-fresh-look-at 
-board-committees/$FILE/ey-cbm-a-fresh-look-at-board-committees.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5R8G/RMUU]. The report is based on the 418 proxy state-
ments filed on May 15, 2018. Id. 
 163. See infra Table 3.  
 164. See generally Arlen & Kahan, supra note 33 (examining the practice of 
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particular relevance is Kaal and Lacine (2014), which evaluates 
corporate governance-related provisions in all publicly available 
DPAs (N = 271) over the period 1993–2013. They report that 8% 
of these DPAs (meaning, 22) contained provisions requiring the 
company concerned to make changes to its existing board struc-
tures, “often creating new board committees.”165 This suggests 
that entry into a DPA may sometimes be a trigger for the estab-
lishment of a compliance committee. However, the low absolute 
number of such prosecutions of public companies means that this 
form of prosecutorial settling-up cannot account for the extent of 
CC adoption.166  
2. Data Sources and Sample Description 
Our empirical study utilizes four main data sources: 
(1) BoardEx: an extensive database detailing board membership 
and structure, including committees, to determine whether com-
panies have established a CC, and if so, when;167 (2) Duke/UVA 
Corporate Prosecution Registry: an extensive database on corpo-
rate prosecutions including plea agreements, trial convictions, 
and all DPAs entered into by the DOJ with organizations from 
1990 onwards to explore links between the exposure to corporate 
prosecution and CC adoption;168 (3) CRSP-Compustat: a widely-
used financial dataset with details of firm financial attributes 
such as firm performance and firm size;169 and (4) SEC EDGAR: 
 
DPA-mandated reforms and discussing appropriate application); Garrett, 
Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 33 (discussing the background and 
examples of DPA-required internal reforms).  
 165. Kaal & Lacine, supra note 34, at 95–96. 
 166. See GARRETT, supra note 8, at 267 (describing how from 2001 to 2012, 
273 public companies were prosecuted). 
 167. Data, BOARDEX, http://corp.boardex.com/data/ [https://perma.cc/7MRK 
-N59D]. BoardEx has data from 1999, but the inclusion of public companies is 
incomplete prior to 2004 mainly because companies were not under regulatory 
pressure to disclose committee information. In 2003, the SEC approved major 
stock exchange rules on board committees (e.g., audit, compensation, and nom-
ination board committees.). See, e.g., Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule 
Change Relating to Corporate Governance, Release No. 34-50625, SEC Docket 
No. SR-NYSE-2004-41 (Nov. 3, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/34 
-50625.pdf [https://perma.cc/4THH-4GST]; SEC Marketplace Rules, NASDAQ 
Rule § 4350(d), SEC, https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/nasdaqllcf1a4_5/ 
nasdaqllcamendrules4000.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NE8-3EDM].  
 168. The Corporate Prosecution Registry was co-created by one of the au-
thors. Ashley & Garrett, supra note 35.  
 169. CRSP-Compustat Merged, CTR. FOR RES. IN SECURITY PRICES, 
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listed companies’ periodic filings and proxy statements to cross-
reference information about companies. 170  By merging these 
four major data sources, we compiled a dataset to examine the 
interaction between ex-post enforcement and ex-ante govern-
ance changes. Our dataset consists of a panel of 6372 unique U.S. 
public companies for the period 2004–2017, giving a total of 
51,620 firm-years. Table 1 sets out the details of variable names, 
variable descriptions, and data sources. Table 2 presents sum-
mary statistics for each variable.  
 
http://www.crsp.com/products/research-products/crspcompustat-merged 
-database [https://perma.cc/75Z8-DR9P].  
 170. See Edgar Company Search, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/ 
searchedgar/companysearch.html [https://perma.cc/X4K5-3XEF].  
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Source 
Compliance 
Committee 
Dummy for whether firm has a board-level 
Compliance Committee (including stand-
alone compliance committee, compliance 




Dummy for DOJ enforcement during pre-





Rate of prosecution in the same industry 
(under Fama-French 48 industry classifi-





Dummy for firm having at least one direc-
tor who concurrently serves on board of 
another company with a Compliance Com-
mittee 
BoardEx 
Ave. Dir. Age Average age of board members  BoardEx 
Male Board Ratio of male board members  BoardEx 
Board Size Number of board members BoardEx 
Aud. Cttee. Ratio 
Ratio of Audit Committee members to en-




Ratio of non-executive directors to total 
board members.  
BoardEx 
Delaware Inc. Dummy for Delaware incorporation SEC EDGAR 
Firm Size  
Natural logarithm of book value of firm’s 








Tobin’s Q (t-1) 
Ratio of firm’s market value to book value 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Name N Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Compliance 
Committee 50,945 0.04 0.19 0 0 1 
DOJ Enforce-
ment 50,945 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 
DOJ Exposure 50,945 0.002 0.004 0.001 0 0.04 
CC Interlock 50,945 0.18 0.39 0 0 1 
Director Aver-
age Age  50,945 61.33 5.17 61.6 33.5 82.17 
Male Board  50,945 0.90 0.10 0.90 0.20 1.00 
Board Size  50,945 8.94 2.72 9 2 26 
Audit Commit-
tee Ratio 50,945 0.48 0.13 0.44 0171 1.00 
NonExecDir. 
Ratio 50,945 0.83 0.10 0.86 0.20 1.00 
Delaware Inc. 50,945 0.57 0.49 1 0 1 
Firm Size: 
log(total assets) 50,945 6.52 2.10 6.53 1.70 12.33 
RoA (t-1) 48,360 -0.03 0.22 0.03 -1.57 0.32 
Tobin’s Q (t-1)  48,385 1.95 1.47 1.42 0.47 10.85 
 
3. Time Trends and Industry Distribution  
Figure 1 shows the number (vertical axis) and proportion 
(bold numbers) of U.S. public companies having used a Compli-
ance Committee during the period 2004–2017. We take a Com-
pliance Committee for these purposes to include (i) a stand-alone 
compliance committee, (ii) a “Risk and Compliance Committee” 
or (iii) restyling an audit committee as “Audit and Compliance” 
during the relevant period. While the trend is slowly and con-
sistently upward, the overall level remains low, with only 4.85% 
of public companies having adopted such a committee by 2017.  
 
 171. In 2004, Sutron Corporation did not have an audit committee. SUTRON 
CORP., 2004 DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (2005), https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/728331/000072833105000038/proxy05.txt [https://perma 
.cc/8L39-B4M9] (“The Board does not have an audit committee or nominating 
committee.”).  
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Figure 1. Time Trend in Compliance Committee Adoptions, 
2004–17 
 
Note: Our sample companies represent all U.S. public companies from 
BoardEx, excluding investment funds and trusts. The dashed line 
shows the total number of public companies that have a Compliance 
Committee at the board level. The solid line shows the percentage of 
public companies that have a Compliance Committee at the board 
level. “Compliance Committee” includes any board committee that uses 
the term “compliance” in its official name. 
 
Our findings are in marked contrast to the results reported 
in the PwC survey, which estimated that 20% of companies had 
established a CC by 2016.172 Our data suggest CCs are used far 
less frequently than had previously been believed to be the case. 
It appears likely that the survey was carried out with PwC’s cli-
ents, raising an obvious issue of selection bias: firms that have 
compliance officers are likely to report that they engage in other 
compliance activities. A more recent article by EY reported that 
16% of S&P 500 companies had compliance committees in 
2018.173  
 
 172. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 173. See EY CENTER FOR BOARD MATTERS, supra note 162. The report is 
based on the 418 proxy statements filed as of May 15, 2018.  
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Table 3 shows the industry distribution of firms that have 
established CCs. Industry classification is according to the 
Fama-French 48-industry classification (FFI48) scheme.174 As 
can be seen in Table 3, the industries that are the heaviest 
adopters of CCs are banking, healthcare, pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, medical equipment, and business services. An intuitive ex-
planation is that these industries are all heavily regulated; in 
most cases some form of compliance program is mandated by 
substantive regulation.175 Firms that are required to set up a 
compliance program are presumably more likely to find it worth-
while to establish a committee at the board level to oversee that 
program. 
 
Table 3. Top 5 Industries of firms adopting Compliance 
Committees, 2004–17 
 
Industry (FFI48) % of companies from each indus-




Pharmaceutical Products 12.14% 
Medical Equipment 8.62% 
Business Services 7.67% 
 
In Table 4 we compare, by industry, the proportion of firms 
that faced DOJ enforcement, and the proportion of firms that 
adopted compliance committees over the period 2004–17. There 
is not an obvious relationship. Firms in the pharmaceutical, util-
ities, and medical equipment industries, which have relatively 
 
 174. Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Industry Cost of Equity, 43 J. FIN. 
ECON. 153 (1997). See generally THE WHARTON SCH., UNIV. OF PENN., PROCE-
DURES USING FAMA AND FRENCH 48 INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATIONS (1993), 
https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/support/research-wrds/research 
-guides/procedures-using-fama-and-french-48-industry-classification/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q6PH-BSGU] (showing Fama-French industry classifica-
tions). Fama-French 48 Industry Classifications were created by using each 
company’s four-digit Standard Industrial Classification collected from EDGAR. 
Id. 
 175. For examples of such statutes, see supra note 157. 
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high rates of CC adoption, also have two of the highest prosecu-
tion rates during our sample period. However, the same is not 
true for banking and healthcare, which have relatively low pros-
ecution rates yet high rates of CC adoption. Moreover, while the 
aircraft industry has the highest prosecution rate of any indus-
try over our sample period, no company in the industry has 
adopted a CC. 
 
Table 4. Likelihood of DOJ enforcement and frequency of 














% of CC 
use  
Aircraft 
21 3 24 12.50% 0% 
Food Products 
66 8 74 10.81% 2.70% 
Shipbuilding, Rail-
road 
12 1 13 7.69% 0% 
Utilities 
127 10 137 7.30% 2.19% 
Automobiles and 
Truck 
67 5 72 6.94% 0% 
Petroleum and Nat-
ural 
190 14 204 6.86% 1.47% 
Coal 
14 1 15 6.67% 0% 
Agriculture 
17 1 18 5.56% 0% 
Chemicals 
106 6 112 5.36% 0% 
Medical Equipment 
208 10 218 4.59% 1.83% 
Almost Nothing 
47 2 49 4.08% 2.04% 
Pharmaceutical 
Products 
499 19 518 3.67% 2.90% 
Wholesale 
161 6 167 3.59% 0.6% 
Transportation 
108 4 112 3.57% 2.68% 
Insurance 
166 6 172 3.49% 2.33% 
Printing and Pub-
lishing 
56 2 58 3.45% 0% 
Apparel 
58 2 60 3.33% 0% 
Construction 
61 2 63 3.17% 4.76% 
Electrical Equip-
ment 
61 2 63 3.17% 0% 
Business Supplies 
35 1 36 2.78% 0% 
  














% of CC 
use  
Machinery 
149 4 153 2.61% 1.96% 
Measuring and 
Control 
119 3 122 2.46% 2.46% 
Computers 
199 5 204 2.45% 1.47% 
Retail 
274 6 280 2.14% 1.43% 
Banking 
753 16 769 2.08% 5.98% 
Healthcare 
114 2 116 1.72% 28.44% 
Restaurants, Hotels, 
Motels 
115 2 117 1.71% 2.56% 
Steel Works Etc. 
64 1 65 1.54% 0% 
Construction Mate-
rial 
70 1 71 1.41% 1.40% 
Personal Services 
71 1 72 1.39% 0% 
Business Services 
805 7 812 0.86% 1.97% 
Electronic Equip-
ment 
365 2 367 0.55% 1.36% 
Beer & Liquor 
18 0 18 0% 0% 
Candy & Soda 
5 0 5 0% 0% 
Communication 
175 0 175 0% 0% 
Consumer Goods 
64 0 64 0% 0% 
Defense 
12 0 12 0% 0% 
Entertainment 
72 0 72 0% 2.78% 
Fabricated Products 




30 0 30 0% 3.33% 
Precious Metals 
10 0 10 0% 0% 
Real Estate 
55 0 55 0% 0% 
Recreation 
34 0 34 0% 2.94% 
Rubber and Plastic 
Products 
37 0 37 0% 0% 
Shipping Contain-
ers 
10 0 10 0% 0% 
Textiles 
13 0 13 0% 0% 
Tobacco Products 
8 0 8 0% 0% 
Trading 
397 0 397 0% 1.76% 
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4. Types and Composition of Board Compliance Committees  
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of compliance committee 
adoption by three different types of nomenclature (namely: a 
stand-alone “Compliance Committee”, a “Risk and Compliance 
Committee” without a stand-alone Compliance Committee, and 
re-naming the audit committee as “Audit and Compliance” with-
out a stand-alone Compliance Committee) over the period 2004–
2017. As can be seen in Figure 2, a stand-alone Compliance Com-
mittee is by far the most frequent way in which a compliance 
committee is explicitly recognized at the board level.  
 
Figure 2. Types of Compliance Committees by Years,  
2004–17 
 
Note: Our sample companies represent all U.S. public companies from 
BoardEx, excluding investment funds and trusts. For a given year, 
solid bars show the number of public companies with a “stand-alone” 
Compliance Committee; bars with dots show the number of public com-
panies with a “Risk and Compliance Committee”; and bars with diago-
nals show the number of public companies with an Audit committee 
restyled as an “Audit and Compliance Committee.” 
 
Table 5 below provides descriptive statistics on the compo-
sition of board compliance committees in our study period. The 
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average compliance committee has three members; of those 
members, more than 85% are independent directors. Moreover, 
about 30% of compliance committee members contemporane-
ously serve on their company’s Audit committee. Conversely, ap-
proximately 10% of compliance committee members sit exclu-
sively on that committee. On average, compliance committee 
members have been served as board members of the company for 
7.6 years.  
 
Table 5. Characteristics of Board Compliance Committees 
of US Public Companies, 2004–17.  
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Size of CC 1,863 4.43 1.68 1 15 
Ratio of NonExecDir. 1,863 0.85 0.21 0 1 
Ratio of Audit committee 
Members on CC 
1,863 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Ratio of Directors  
Exclusively Serve on CC 
1,863 0.10 0.19 0 1 
 
These data suggest that CC adoption is actually quite low 
amongst U.S. public companies; certainly, considerably lower 
than had previously been thought to be the case. In light of this, 
we would like to understand the factors that make firms more or 
less likely to adopt compliance committees.  
B. ARE FIRMS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH COMPLIANCE 
COMMITTEES?  
A threshold question is whether adoption of a board-level 
CC is voluntary or compelled. If firms adopt CCs only where com-
pelled, this would imply that the low take-up is because firms 
generally do not see CCs as valuable. In this section, we investi-
gate how much of CC adoption is explicable in this way. The lack 
of a board-level compliance committee does not directly violate 
any current substantive regulations. 176  There are regulatory 
mandates for compliance, but not mandates requiring the crea-
tion of a board level committee. However, there are two potential 
exceptions to this: Qualified Legal Compliance Committees and 
Prosecution Agreements.  
 
 176. See text accompanying note 60, supra. 
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1. Qualified Legal Compliance Committees  
The first possible route to a mandatory CC is via the SEC 
Rule on “Qualified Legal Compliance Committees” (QLCC) 
promulgated in 2003 as part of the post-Enron concern about cor-
porate compliance.177 Although Rule 205 does not mandate a 
board level compliance committee, it permits a version of such a 
committee to be used as an alternate mechanism for “up the lad-
der” mandatory reporting of material misconduct observed by 
the company’s outside attorneys.178 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act re-
quired attorneys to report evidence of material misconduct to the 
company’s chief legal officer and/or chief executive officer,179 and 
if these persons do not respond properly, to the audit committee 
or the entire board of directors.180 As an exception to this re-
quirement, the SEC offered an alternative reporting mechanism 
for attorneys. If the issuer establishes a QLCC, attorneys may 
fulfill their reporting obligation by reporting the matter to the 
QLCC.181 When the rule was first introduced, some commenta-
tors suggested firms whose attorneys found the standard report-
ing channel onerous would establish QLCCs.182  
This might consequently be a channel through which some 
companies felt it necessary to establish compliance commit-
tees.183  
However, the SEC’s definition of a QLCC for these purposes 
does not require a stand-alone committee.184 Any committee that 
includes at least two independent directors and one audit com-
mittee member—including the Audit committee itself—qualifies 
as a “QLCC.”185 Thus an issuer motivated solely by Rule 205 
 
 177. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2010); see also Jill Fisch & Caroline Gentile, The 
Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to 
Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 523 (2003). 
 178. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1). 
 179. Id.; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 307, 116 
Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012)). 
 180. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3).  
 181. Id. § 205.3(c)(1). 
 182. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 177, at 547 (“These attorneys face less 
work, uncertainty, and exposure to liability when reporting to a QLCC.”).  
 183. See Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance: 
The Diffusion of QLCC’s, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251 (2005) (explaining the need 
for compliance committees). 
 184. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1). 
 185. Id. § 205.2(k)(1). 
  
1240 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1191 
 
would generally find it much more straightforward to constitute 
the Audit committee as the “QLCC” for these purposes, rather 
than to go to the trouble of establishing a new stand-alone com-
pliance committee.186 This suggests that Rule 205 is unlikely to 
have been a significant driver of compliance committee creation. 
To verify this, we searched our data for examples where 
firms had established stand-alone QLCCs, as opposed to simply 
designating the Audit committee for this purpose. We found that 
the number of active stand-alone QLCCs has always been very 
low and has decreased over the years. Its peak was in 2004 when 
the concept was first introduced; in that year, twenty companies 
inaugurated stand-alone QLCCs. These amounted to 14% of the 
total number of companies with stand-alone compliance commit-
tees at that point (136). The number of QLCCs fell steadily over 
the period of our study, such that by 2017, only three public com-
panies (ArcBest Corp., Brunswick Corp., and Comerica Inc.) re-
tained stand-alone QLCCs. That was less than 2% of the total 
companies with stand-alone compliance committees (157). 
Clearly, SEC Rule 205 has not stimulated a significant number 
of compliance committee formations in our dataset. 
2. Prosecution Agreements  
A second circumstance in which companies might be re-
quired to adopt CCs would be if this were demanded by prosecu-
tors as part of a DPA or other settlement, as in our case study of 
Las Vegas Sands.187 But how frequently does this happen? To 
shed light on this, we reviewed the text of all prosecution agree-
ments entered with public companies since 2001 in the Duke & 
University of Virginia Corporate Prosecution Registry.188 There 
are 381 public firms in the Registry that were prosecuted during 
the period from 2001–2018. Thirteen received declinations, one 
was acquitted at trial, four received pre-trial dismissals, and 
three received trial convictions; those cases are not examined 
here.  
 
 186. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 177, at 542; Donald C. Langevoort, The Hu-
man Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Conse-
quences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 823 (2001).  
 187. See supra Part I.C.4; see also Kaal & Lacine, supra note 34, at 85 fig.1 
(finding that 31% of agreements had requirements affecting boards, but only 8% 
mandated new board committees). 
 188. See Ashley & Garrett, supra note 35. 
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In this analysis, we focus on the 374 public firms prosecuted 
in that registry, including the 192 that entered into deferred and 
non-prosecution agreements and the 168 that entered into plea 
agreements.189 This dataset is significantly larger than that pre-
viously considered by Kaal and Lacine, primarily because we in-
clude plea agreements as well as DPAs.190 However, our data do 
not include compliance undertakings that may also be ordered 
as part of court-supervised probation, since the terms of special 
probation are not always available on judicial dockets.191  
We coded all agreements that referred to the board by im-
posing any new affirmative obligation on the board (as opposed 
to not referring to the board at all or acknowledging prior acts of 
the board with respect to compliance). Of the 374 cases, the text 
of 45 public companies’ agreements are missing; they are not 
available on dockets or were not made available by the Depart-
ment of Justice. Of the 329 remaining cases, 115 (35%) included 
terms that imposed some obligation on the board.192 Of those 
cases, only five agreements (1.5%) required the creation of board-
level compliance committees.193 Prosecutors clearly do not de-
mand that boards establish CCs as part of plea agreements or 
 
 189. We do not examine the cases of thirteen more public companies that 
received declinations, four dismissals, three convictions at trial, and one acquit-
tal at trial.  
 190. Kaal & Lacine, supra note 34, at 84 (describing the author’s dataset 
reviewing 271 DPAs entered into from 1993–2013).  
 191. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12, § 8D1.4, Appli-
cation n.1. 
 192. This is consistent with Kaal and Lacine’s finding that 38% of DPAs in 
their sample required some type of “board changes.” Kaal & Lacine, supra note 
34, at 95. 
 193. The Computer Associates Agreement from 2004 required the company 
to establish a compliance committee (or a combined audit and compliance com-
mittee), as well as add two independent directors to its board, and create a new 
audit department that reports to the new board committee. See Deferred Pros-
ecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Comput. Assocs. Int’l (2004), 
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/detail-files/ 
589.html [https://perma.cc/2F9T-9F22]. The 2008 Unum Group agreement re-
quired the establishment of a new compliance committee of the Board. See De-
ferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Unum Grp. Agreement 
(2008), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/detail 
-files/738.html [https://perma.cc/ZWE3-36KV]. The 2012 Moneygram Interna-
tional agreement required the bank to create “an Independent Compliance and 
Ethics Committee of the Board of Directors with direct oversight of the Chief 
Compliance Officer and the Compliance Program” and responsibility “for ensur-
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DPAs.194 To be sure, some other cases may also involve parallel 
agreements with regulators who themselves imposed obligations 
on the board. Nevertheless, it seems that firms very rarely create 
compliance committees because prosecutors negotiate them as 
part of a DPA or plea agreement.  
What we learn from the combination of these inquiries is 
that the vast majority of the firms that establish compliance 
committees are not compelled to do so. Rather, it is a voluntary 
decision.  
C. WHY MIGHT FIRMS CHOOSE TO ESTABLISH COMPLIANCE 
COMMITTEES? 
These observations shift our focus to the cases in which CC 
adoption is voluntary; where boards choose to oversee compli-
ance through a separate committee. Given that less than 5% of 
public companies established a CC between 2004–2017, these 
firms are early adopters of the new corporate practice. As dis-
cussed in Part I.C, adopting a CC has real costs for a firm’s board 
but also has a real significance in terms of enhanced oversight 
capability. What are the factors that might make a firm choose 
to do so? In this subpart, we consider three: heightened compli-
ance activity, the availability of capacity among board members, 
and the gradual diffusion of information about CCs. 
 
ing that the Company is in compliance with all aspects of the Agreement.” De-
ferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Moneygram Int’l (2012), 
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/agreements/ 
MoneyGram.pdf [https://perma.cc/C855-LCLB]. The non-prosecution agree-
ment with Las Vegas Sands required the creation of a board-level compliance 
agreement. Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Las Vegas 
Sands Corp. (2013), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution 
-registry/agreements/Las-Vegas-Sands-Corp-NPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW9S 
-SA88]. The 2014 Stryker Corp. agreement required the creation of a new com-
pliance committee and that the Board, or a designated committee, “shall con-
duct a review of the effectiveness of Stryker’s Compliance Program as it relates 
to the marketing, promotion, and sale of medical devices.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
& Stryker Corp., Plea Agreement (2014), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/ 
corporate-prosecution-registry/detail-files/770.html [https://perma.cc/R7DS 
-8BZV]. 
 194. The finding is qualitatively similar to that reported by Kaal & Lacine, 
supra note 34, at 96 (finding that just 8% of firms had adopted a compliance 
committee after prosecution).  
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1. Heightened Compliance Activity  
All other things equal, a CC would be most useful for com-
panies in which it could complement other large investments in 
compliance programs. Where a firm has an extensive compliance 
program, the compliance oversight intensity a CC can deliver 
would be useful to enhance the effectiveness of that program. 
Neither the absolute level of, nor an increase in, compliance in-
vestments is readily measurable in most contexts because, as we 
have described in Part II.A.1, firms typically do not disclose the 
scope of their compliance activity, in part because of fear of send-
ing an adverse signal.195 Nevertheless, there are a number of 
readily-identifiable circumstances that might be expected to be 
associated with an increase in compliance investment so that 
compliance committee adoption would not carry the usual nega-
tive signal.196 Thus, firms are free to exploit the complementari-
ties.  
One relevant indicator may be an enforcement event, such 
as prosecution or a DPA. When firms enter into DPAs—a public 
event with high salience—they commonly agree to increase their 
pre-existing level of compliance activity.197 And in the period 
leading up to a DPA, firms may invest heavily in conducting an 
internal investigation and co-operating with the authorities. 
Such a ramping-up of compliance investment could also be a trig-
ger for boards stepping in to engage in more direct oversight 
through a CC, as in the cases of LendingClub and AIG, even if 
this is not specifically mandated by prosecutors.  
This conjecture is borne out in our dataset of DPAs and plea 
agreements. While prosecutors very rarely require establish-
ment of a compliance committee,198 many of these agreements 
nevertheless envisage expansions in compliance that will involve 
the board in some way. Ninety-six (29%) of these prosecution 
agreements created new positions that report directly to the 
board.199 In some of those cases, still more is required, such as 
 
 195. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 196. See Elizabeth Daniels, Note, Getting DPA Review and Rejection Right, 
16 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 120 (2016) (“[A]ll DPAs in this area require con-
tinued cooperation, heightened compliance mechanisms, and law-abiding con-
duct measured over a set period of time . . . .”). 
 197. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 8, at 71–72. 
 198. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 199. For example, seventy-one settlements, chiefly in FCPA cases, contained 
the following language, requiring the company to: “Assign responsibility to one 
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that the compliance officer must make at least quarterly reports 
to the board. Some agreements required creation of a compliance 
officer for a specific compliance risk, such as the Online Phar-
macy Compliance Officer created in the United Parcel Service 
agreement.200 On the other hand, some cases specifically suggest 
a more occasional role. The Monsanto agreement, for example, 
asks that the board hire an outside auditor to assess its FCPA 
compliance not less than once every five years.201 In additional 
cases, an independent monitor is appointed, and the reports of 
that monitor would be normally reviewed by the board (even if 
the publicly released agreement does not say so specifically). 
Some agreements do discuss the board-monitor relationship. For 
example, the Exactech case requires that the Chairman of the 
Board, CEO, President, CFO, Executive Vice President for R&D, 
Corporate Counsel, and Chief Compliance Officer all meet quar-
terly with the Monitor.202 Such a role would end when the agree-
ment ends.203  
While there is variation in individual agreements, the gen-
eral thrust is for DPAs to impose heightened compliance obliga-
tions on the company, and, in one-third of cases, directly to ex-
pect more board engagement. While these do not direct the board 
 
or more senior corporate executives for the implementation and oversight of the 
company’s anti-corruption compliance policies. These officials shall have au-
thority to report directly to independent monitoring bodies, the company’s board 
of directors, and shall have an adequate level of autonomy from management.” 
See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Zimmer Bi-
omet (2017), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/ 
agreements/zimmer-biomet-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG76-DXDE].  
 200. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & United Parcel 
Serv. (2013), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/ 
agreements/UPS.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7KF-9GVV].  
 201. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Monsanto Co. 
(2005), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/ 
agreements/monsanto.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MX9-Y9XZ]. 
 202. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Exactech, Inc. 
(2010), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/ 
agreements/exactech.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B7G-4CC9].  
 203. Some agreements similarly state that the board must review compli-
ance pursuant to the agreement during the term of the agreement, without im-
posing a further ongoing obligation. See, e.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. 
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to establish a CC, the heightened compliance investment and as-
sociated oversight expectations may be expected to make it more 
likely for such companies to establish a CC. A DPA is often a 
trigger for a step up in compliance by the company; this in turn 
should be a cause for increased oversight. Board committee over-
sight makes internal compliance efforts more effective; height-
ened internal compliance provides more compliance-relevant in-
formation to funnel to the board committee, making oversight 
more effective.   
Risk of prosecution is, of course, hard to measure, especially 
where it turns on factors that are internal to the firm. However, 
it seems reasonable to expect that firms in regulated industries 
may expect heightened scrutiny of their actions.204 Another rel-
evant indicator may be rates of prosecution in a firm’s industry 
in recent years. This can convey information about the resources 
and enforcement priorities of prosecutors, which vary over time. 
Thirdly, with respect in particular to exposure to prosecution un-
der the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, one might expect this to 
be highest for firms that do business in corruption-prone juris-
dictions.205  
2. Board Capacity  
Our discussion in this Part has so far focused on benefits to 
firms from establishing a CC. Yet as we saw in Part I.C, the costs 
may also be significant, given the scarcity of independent direc-
tors’ time. Consequently, the structure of a firm’s board may af-
fect its willingness to contemplate setting up a new compliance 
committee, as opposed to channeling compliance work to the ex-
isting AC. A new compliance committee will require personnel—
primarily independent directors—to staff it. We know from our 
interview research206 that independent directors, who have only 
part-time relationships with their companies, face very tight 
time constraints. Consequently, we might expect that firms with 
larger boards, and in particular, with more independent direc-
tors, would be more likely to establish a CC. The flipside of the 
 
 204. Such firms may have additional reasons for investing in compliance 
programs, as aspects of these may be required by the applicable regulation. 
 205. See generally Stefan Zeume, Bribes and Firm Value, 30 REV. FIN. 
STUDS. 1457 (documenting effects on firms with subsidiaries in countries prone 
to corruption from passage of FCPA-equivalent legislation in the U.K.). 
 206. See infra Part III.A.2. 
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same issue is the AC’s capacity to take on compliance oversight 
work. The larger a firm’s AC, the greater the capacity for com-
pliance oversight to be routed through the AC as opposed to the 
inauguration of a new CC.  
3. Learning Costs 
The pattern of CC adoption—rare, but gradually increasing 
over time—is consistent with other types of innovation in corpo-
rate governance. Even if new mechanisms are beneficial, it is 
costly for boards facing tight time constraints to learn about 
these benefits.207 These learning costs put a brake on the diffu-
sion of new practices. As a consequence, boards may be more 
likely to adopt a new innovation of which one or more of their 
members have prior experience in a different context—for exam-
ple, through sitting on the board of a different company at which 
the innovation has been deployed. Prior studies suggest that in-
terlocking directors (that is, directors who serve on the boards of 
more than one company concurrently) can function as a trans-
mission mechanism for learning about a range of new corporate 
 
 207. See infra Part I.C (explaining that the scarcity of a director’s time may 
increase the cost of implementation). 
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governance practices.208 These include poison pill adoption,209 
CEO compensation, 210  option backdating, 211  and indemnifica-
tion protection.212 Applied to our current context, it may be that 
directors who have experienced a compliance committee in oper-
ation at another company may be a source of information for col-
leagues about the benefits (or costs) of these bodies.  
D. WHICH FIRMS DO ESTABLISH COMPLIANCE COMMITTEES? 
Having explored reasons why firms might choose to estab-
lish a board compliance committee, we are now in a position to 
test these in our data. In this subpart, we present multivariate 
 
 208. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Outside 
Directors’ Protection, 46 J. LEGAL STUDS. 129 (2017) (suggesting that interlock-
ing directors contribute to outside directors’ knowledge and bargaining power 
in restoring directors’ indemnification protection); John M. Bizjak et al., Option 
Backdating and Board Interlocks, 22 REV. FIN. STUDS. 4821, 4838 (2009) (show-
ing that interlocking directors were an important conduit contributing to the 
spread of backdating of option grants); Gerald F. David, Agents Without Princi-
ples? The Spread of the Poison Pill Through the Intracorporate Network, 36 AD-
MIN. SCI. Q. 583 (1991) (showing that poison pill adoptions increase with inter-
locking directors); Erik Devos et al., Are Interlocked Directors Effective 
Monitors?, 38 FIN. MGMT. 861 (2009) (documenting that the presence of inter-
locked directors is associated with the reduced sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
firm performance); id. at 862 (“A more recent stream in this line of research 
suggests that the presence of interlocked directors and connected boards may 
compromise the effectiveness of board monitoring, especially with respect to the 
setting of compensation of CEOs.”); Kevin F. Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking 
Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 331, 338 (1997) (suggesting that firms whose CEOs are reciprocally 
interlocked by serving on each other’s boards pay their CEOs substantially 
higher because these CEOs may have both the incentive and the opportunity to 
raise each other’s pay); Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 
51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 811 (2005) (“Unless executives have an informational ad-
vantage that allows them to develop superior forecasts regarding the future 
market movements that drive these predicted returns, the results suggest that 
the official grant date must have been set retroactively.”); Christine Shropshire, 
The Role of the Interlocking Director and Board Receptivity in the Diffusion of 
Practices, 35 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 246, 252–53 (2010) (theoretically proposing 
that “the likelihood of knowledge transfer increases if the interlocking director 
serves on the relevant board committee at the focal firm”).  
 209. See generally David, supra note 208 (discussing the theories of the poi-
son pill and its use by management teams). 
 210. See generally Hallock, supra note 208 (explaining the concept of CEO 
interlocks and how they can lead to higher compensation).  
 211. See Bizjak et al., supra note 208.  
 212. See Barzuza & Curtis, supra note 208. 
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regression results that shed light on these hypotheses. Our re-
sults show that companies are more likely to adopt compliance 
committees if they have been targets of prosecution, and/or if one 
of their board members has outside experience of the use of com-
pliance committees. However, the overall level of adoption of 
compliance committees among public companies is still ex-
tremely low: less than 5%. 
1. Regression Specification: Main Variables of Interest 
We first identify variables that reflect, or at least proxy for, 
the presence of the factors we described in Part II.C as affecting 
firms’ choices whether or not to establish a board compliance 
committee. Our variable DOJ Enforcement seeks to capture the 
effect of prosecution. It is a dummy (binary) variable taking the 
value 1 if the firm was on the receiving end of a DOJ enforcement 
action in the previous three years, resulting in a DPA, a plea 
agreement, or a conviction. Turning to the risk, or likelihood of 
prosecution, we use a variable DOJ Exposure, which measures 
the prosecution rate of peer companies in the same industry over 
the period 2004–2017, based on Duke/UVA Corporate Prosecu-
tion Registry data). We also use industry dummy variables, 
which allow us to explore the effect of being in a regulated indus-
try.  
To explore relationships with board structure, we include 
variables Board Size—that is, the total number of board mem-
bers; NonExecDir. Ratio—the proportion of the board that is 
comprised of directors who are not also executives—and Aud. 
Cttee. Ratio—namely, the ratio of directors sitting on the Audit 
committee to the entire board membership. Finally, our variable 
CC Interlock indicates whether any of the company’s board mem-
bers also sits on the board of another company with a CC.213 This 
captures outside experience with CC implementation. 
 
 213. We constructed this variable by first identifying in each sample year all 
“interlocking” directors in our data concurrently serving on two or more boards, 
of which at least one had adopted a compliance committee. We then converted 
this director-level data into the company-level dummy variable CC Interlock by 
giving a value of 1 to a company that has at least one interlocking director con-
currently sitting on the board of another company with a compliance committee 
for any given year.  
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Table 6 reports logit regression results for our panel of U.S. 
public firms during the period 2004–2017.214 The dependent var-
iable, Compliance Committee, is a dummy (binary) variable tak-
ing the value 1 if a firm adopts a compliance committee in a par-
ticular year. We take “compliance committee” adoption for these 
purposes to include stand-alone compliance committees, risk and 
compliance committees, and audit and compliance commit-
tees,215 although we have seen in Figure 2 that the lion’s share 
of this activity is stand-alone compliance committees. Model (1) 
shows relationships between each variable and CC adoption 
when all variables of interest are included. Models (2)–(4) each 
include only one of three main variables of interest (DOJ En-
forcement, DOJ Exposure, and CC Interlock) to consider 




 214. We use a logit regression because the dependent variable in this case is 
binary. The coefficients report marginal effects. 
 215. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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Table 6. Determinants of Compliance Committee Adoptions 
 



















     
DOJ Enforcement 0.839*** 0.857***   
 (0.281) (0.282)   
DOJ Exposure 3.424  9.099  
 (7.805)  (7.782)  
CC Interlock 0.463***   0.465*** 
 (0.130)   (0.129) 
Ave. Dir. Age -0.00271 -0.00364 -0.00385 -0.00291 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
Male Board 0.302 0.178 0.146 0.270 
 (0.623) (0.615) (0.615) (0.623) 
Board Size 0.0830*** 0.0875*** 0.0884*** 0.0839*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0300) 
Aud. Cttee. Ratio 1.129** 1.127** 1.160** 1.162** 
 (0.453) (0.457) (0.456) (0.453) 
NonExecDir. Ratio 1.174 1.338 1.357 1.193 
 (0.905) (0.907) (0.909) (0.907) 
Delaware Inc. -0.0885 -0.0666 -0.0746 -0.0950 
 (0.168) (0.169) (0.168) (0.168) 
Firm Size 0.163*** 0.194*** 0.211*** 0.179*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0485) (0.0479) (0.0486) 
RoA(t-1) 0.767* 0.715* 0.721* 0.774* 
 (0.410) (0.413) (0.416) (0.413) 
Tobin’s Q(t-1) 0.0101 0.0146 0.0104 0.00562 
































Note: Logit models of the likelihood that a firm will have a Compliance 
Committee in a particular year. Compliance Committee includes stand-
alone compliance committees, risk and compliance committees, and au-
dit and compliance committees; DOJ Enforcement is a dummy for 
whether the firm has been the subject of a DPA or plea agreement in 
the previous 3 years; DOJ Exposure is the rate of prosecution in the 
same industry during the previous three years; CC Interlock is a 
dummy for whether any board member concurrently sits on the board 
of another company with a Compliance Committee; Ave. Dir. Age is av-
erage age of board members; Male Board is the ratio of male board 
members; Board Size is total number of board members; Aud. Cttee. 
Ratio is the ratio of Audit committee members to entire board mem-
bers; NonExecDir. Ratio is the ratio of non-executive board members to 
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entire board members; Delaware Inc. is a dummy for Delaware incor-
poration; Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; 
RoA(t-1) is the firm’s Return on Assets in the previous year; Tobin’s  
Q (t-1) is the firm’s market to book ratio in the previous year. Values in 
RoA, Tobin’s Q, and Total Assets are winsorized at one percent in both 
tails. All models have year and industry fixed effects (using Fama-
French 48 industry classification). Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
2. Control Variables 
In all specifications, we include year and industry fixed ef-
fects. We also include a number of additional covariates (control 
variables) that might be expected to affect CC adoption. First, 
the size of the firm as captured by Total Assets. There is a fixed 
cost associated with CC establishment, and the size of compli-
ance investments are likely to be increasing with the size of the 
firm. Thus, we would expect firm size to be correlated with CC 
adoption, which in fact it is in all our regression specifications. 
Second, firm prior performance, as captured by RoA (return on 
assets) and Tobin’s Q,216 in each case lagged by one year.217 Nei-
ther appears to have any significant relationship with CC adop-
tion. We also include a dummy variable for whether the firm is 
incorporated in Delaware, because prior literature establishes 
that due to Delaware’s pre-eminence as a jurisdiction of choice 
for public companies, firms incorporated there are different in 
many respects from firms that choose to remain incorporated in 
their home states.218 We find no significant effect of Delaware 
incorporation on CC adoption.  
Finally, we include two variables relating to board charac-
teristics: Male Board and Ave. Dir. Age in case gender diversity 
 
 216. “Tobin’s Q” is here taken to be the ratio of a firm’s market value to the 
book value of its assets, a commonly used proxy for firm performance. For a 
discussion of the derivation of this measure, its common use, and its limitations, 
see Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s Q, VAND. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019).  
 217. “Lagging” the variable by one year means that when considering values 
of variables from year x, the value of the lagged variable that is included is for 
year x – 1.  
 218. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIR-
ICAL LEGAL STUDS. 605, 607 (2012); Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ De-
cisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 383–89 (2003); Kate Litvak, 
How Much Can We Learn by Regressing Corporate Characteristics Against the 
State of Incorporation?, J.L. FIN. & ACCT. (forthcoming 2019). 
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or average age of directors affects openness to CC adoption. The 
coefficient for these variables is not statistically significant. 
3. Discussion of Results 
We now turn to our main results of interest. The variable 
DOJ Enforcement is positive and strongly statistically signifi-
cant (at the 99% level) both with and without influence of the 
other two variables of interest as shown in specifications (1) and 
(2) respectively. This means that companies that have faced DOJ 
enforcement during the previous three years are much more 
likely to adopt CCs at the board level. This suggests that the in-
creased investment in compliance programs commonly de-
manded in DPAs and plea agreements (reviewed in Part II.C.1) 
is associated with the adoption of CCs by these firms. Because 
we know that the DPAs and plea agreements almost never spe-
cifically mandate the creation of a CC,219 this implies that these 
firms establish CCs to enhance the firm’s overall compliance ca-
pacity in light of the compliance investments that are otherwise 
required. 
What about risk of prosecution? Although the coefficients for 
DOJ Exposure have the expected sign (positive), it is notable 
that neither of them is anywhere near statistically significant. 
This means that the industry risk of prosecution does not influ-
ence the likelihood of CC adoption by companies in that indus-
try. As we use industry fixed effects, we can also explore whether 
there is a greater pattern of CC use in regulated industries. As 
discussed in Part II.C.1, firms in regulated industries—such as 
healthcare, pharmaceuticals, and petroleum and natural gas—
may face higher expectations and scrutiny regarding compliance 
activity. However, apart from healthcare,220 the coefficients for 
these three industry dummies (unreported) are not significant. 
We also find that director interlocks may provide a mecha-
nism for diffusion of information about CCs. The coefficients for 
CC Interlock are positive and strongly statistically significant (at 
the 99% level) with or without the influence of DOJ Enforcement 
and DOJ Exposure, as shown in models (1) and (4). That is, 
boards with a director who has outside experience of CCs are 
much more likely to adopt a CC. This suggests that “learning 
 
 219. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 220. The coefficients for the healthcare industry dummy are positive and 
significant at the 99% level in all models.  
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effects” may be present in CC adoption: boards learn from the 
experience of their members about the way in which CCs func-
tion.  
Turning to board capacity, the variable Board Size has a 
positive coefficient in all the regression models and is statisti-
cally significant at the 95% level in all models. This result is con-
sistent with the idea that CC adoption may be made easier by 
the presence of more directors, which increases the capacity of 
the board to staff a compliance committee. This is independent 
of the size of the audit committee, which we capture separately 
through Aud. Cttee. Ratio. The coefficient on Aud. Cttee. Ratio is 
positive and statistically significant (at the 95% level) in all spec-
ifications.221 In an unreported test, we saw that adoption of a CC 
was not associated with an increase in board size. This suggests 
that firms with greater board capacity have a stronger predispo-
sition to set up a CC.  
Finally, there appears to be a strong firm size effect in CC 
adoption. The coefficient for Firm Size is positive and strongly 
statistically significant (at the 99% level) in all specifications. 
That this is significant, independent of board size, suggests that 
the channel through which firm size is related to CC adoption is 
not simply that larger firms have larger boards. Rather, it is 
plausibly driven by larger firms having larger-scale compliance 
endeavors, which in turn are more likely to justify board over-
sight through a CC.  
Table 7 shows that the results for DOJ Enforcement, DOJ 
Exposure, CC Interlock, and Firm Size remain very similar when 
we measure the relationship between independent variables we 
used in Table 6 and the adoption of “stand-alone” CCs, which 
excludes CCs combined with either audit or risk committees. 
However, the results for Board Size and Aud. Cttee. Ratio are 




 221. This latter result may be due to the inclusion in the dependent variable 
of cases where firms rebrand their audit committee as “Audit and Compliance,” 
which would be expected to be associated with a larger AC. 
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Table 7. Determinants of Stand-alone Compliance  
Committee Adoptions 
 



















     
DOJ Enforcement 1.010*** 1.026***   
 (0.300) (0.305)   
DOJ Exposure 4.870  12.85  
 (10.000)  (9.999)  
CC Interlock 0.561***   0.561*** 
 (0.147)   (0.145) 
Ave. Dir. Age 0.0112 0.00990 0.00937 0.0106 
 (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0176) 
Male Board 0.254 0.0849 0.0538 0.221 
 (0.727) (0.714) (0.715) (0.729) 
Board Size 0.0160 0.0248 0.0278 0.0190 
 (0.0365) (0.0359) (0.0357) (0.0364) 
Aud. Cttee. Ratio 0.282 0.286 0.338 0.332 
 (0.569) (0.563) (0.564) (0.571) 
NonExecDir. Ratio 0.938 1.199 1.215 0.957 
 (1.098) (1.094) (1.097) (1.102) 
Delaware Inc. -0.0714 -0.0434 -0.0583 -0.0833 
 (0.201) (0.203) (0.201) (0.200) 
Firm Size 0.235*** 0.270*** 0.295*** 0.259*** 
 (0.0578) (0.0572) (0.0559) (0.0565) 
RoA(t-1) 0.732 0.659 0.663 0.737 
 (0.475) (0.479) (0.483) (0.480) 
Tobin’s Q(t-1) 0.0147 0.0194 0.0133 0.00816 
































Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Logit models of the likelihood that a firm will have a stand-alone 
compliance committee in a particular year. Stand-alone Compliance 
Committee solely counts stand-alone compliance committees, excluding 
compliance committees combined with audit committees or risk com-
mittees. DOJ Enforcement is a dummy for whether the firm has been 
the subject of a DPA or plea agreement in the previous three years; 
DOJ Exposure is the rate of prosecution in the same industry during 
the previous three years; CC Interlock is a dummy for whether any 
board member concurrently sits on the board of another company with 
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a Compliance Committee; Ave. Dir. Age is average age of board mem-
bers; Male Board is the ratio of male board members; Board Size is 
total number of board members; Aud. Cttee. Ratio is the ratio of Audit 
committee members to entire board members; NonExecDir. Ratio is the 
ratio of non-executive board members to entire board members; Dela-
ware Inc. is a dummy for Delaware incorporation; Firm Size is the nat-
ural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; RoA(t-1) is the firm’s Return on 
Assets in the previous year; Tobin’s Q(t-1) is the firm’s market to book 
ratio in the previous year. Values in RoA, Tobin’s Q, and Total Assets 
are winsorized at one percent in both tails. All models have year and 
industry fixed effects (using Fama-French 48 industry classification). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
 
Our results show that companies are more likely to adopt 
compliance committees if they have been targets of prosecution 
and if one of their board members has outside experience with 
using a CC. However, there is surprisingly little evidence that 
companies for which compliance investment is likely to be more 
valuable—in regulated industries or industries facing increased 
levels of prosecution activity—are likely to adopt CCs. More fun-
damentally, the overall level of adoption of compliance commit-
tees among public companies is still extremely low: less than 5%. 
This provokes a normative enquiry: Does it matter that the use 
of CCs is so infrequent? And if so, what should policymakers and 
boards do about it? We turn to these questions in Part III. 
III.  RETHINKING BOARD COMPLIANCE   
A. WHY ARE COMPLIANCE COMMITTEES NOT MORE COMMON?  
In the wake of corporate scandals, many have asked how to 
create accountability within corporations. There is, as Samuel 
Buell has described, a responsibility gap, where in the largest 
corporations, the CEOs and high-level officers may not have 
been aware of misconduct, but they also may have presided over 
a non-compliance system in which strong incentives existed to 
profit from misconduct.222 Criminal prosecutions have not been 
effective at targeting higher-level officers, in part because it is 
often quite difficult to show that they were aware of misconduct; 
 
 222. See generally Samuel Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime, 
12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 471 (2018) (discussing the concept of the responsibility gap). 
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indeed they may have been unaware.223 Yet, the public has clam-
ored for accountability, including through criminal convic-
tions.224 Such convictions might lead to severe punishment for 
misconduct with grave social consequences, but it does not pre-
vent future compliance breakdowns.  
One way to accomplish those forward-looking goals is to re-
quire corporations to create better compliance programs. How-
ever, as discussed, little consensus exists regarding what sort of 
compliance works or what type of oversight boards should pro-
vide over compliance. Enforcers, whether regulators or prosecu-
tors, are not able to easily ensure day-to-day oversight over com-
pliance reforms, although they have sometimes attempted to do 
so with the use of independent corporate monitors.225 Instead, it 
often lies to the board to ensure that compliance reforms are in 
place.226 That is why creation of a compliance oversight function 
at the board level has been understood as relevant to the board’s 
oversight role and as a way for the compliance function to be el-
evated in importance and relatively more autonomous from 
management.227 
Of course, the needs of individual companies vary. A central 
message of corporate governance research is that there are few 
general truths about what works best in board structure—much 
of the answer depends on the characteristics of the individual 
firm.228 Consistent with this, we see that firm-level attributes 
predict CC adoption. Our concern here is not with firm-level var-
iation, but the low aggregate level of adoption. In Part I.C, we 
 
 223. See Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 265, 268–71 (2014). 
 224. See Jean Eaglesham & Anupreeta Das, Wall Street Crime: 7 Years, 156 
Cases and Few Convictions, WALL STREET J. (May 27, 2016), https://www 
.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-crime-7-years-156-cases-and-few-convictions 
-1464217378 [https://perma.cc/Y2T6-LY5F]; Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Cri-
sis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
(Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.theregreview.org/2014/01/13/rakoff-no-high-level 
-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/5RE2-TPTC]. 
 225. See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate 
Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1717–19 (2007). 
 226. See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 30.  
 227. See Lipton et al., supra note 112 (noting the importance of a strong “tone 
at the top” on compliance from the board). 
 228. See, e.g., Renée B. Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in Cor-
porate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LIT. 58 
(2010). 
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characterized the adoption of a compliance committee as not a 
matter of “window dressing” for a board, but as having real costs 
and benefits. Our empirical results are consistent with this 
framing. Firms are (i) more likely to adopt CCs upon making in-
creased investment in compliance, and (ii) constraints on board 
capacity to staff a CC make their adoption less likely. Against 
this background, we now consider two further possible interpre-
tations of our results. 
1. Do Companies Invest Enough in Compliance? 
Our results about the link between prosecution and CC 
adoption229 suggest that compliance committees are associated 
with greater underlying investments in compliance. We know 
from the text of DPAs and plea agreements that these CCs are 
not created because prosecutors demand them; 230  rather it 
seems most likely that companies choose to create them to over-
see the heightened compliance programs that we also know—
from the text of the agreements—that prosecutors do demand.231 
One plausible explanation for the low aggregate uptake of 
compliance committees is therefore that companies generally do 
not make sufficient compliance investments to justify a new com-
mittee devoted to their oversight. Of course, given that expendi-
ture on compliance is typically not disclosed, this can only be 
conjecture. And whether it is problematic or not requires us to 
identify a baseline level of “desirable” compliance investment.  
While little is known about the utility of corporate compli-
ance programs in reducing underlying levels of misconduct, it is 
clear that the implementation of an effective compliance pro-
gram is taken into account by prosecutors and other enforcement 
agencies in reducing penalties ex post for firms that have done 
so.232 So, from the firm’s point of view, compliance programs can 
be a worthwhile investment simply to reduce expected enforce-
ment costs. Were firms responding to this incentive, we would 
expect to see more extensive compliance programs in regulated 
industries, and in industries facing increased prosecution rates. 
 
 229. Supra Parts II.C.1, II.D.3. 
 230. Supra Part II.B. 
 231. Supra Part II.B. 
 232. Supra Part I.A. 
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Yet we find little, if any, evidence for either of these.233 A possi-
ble explanation is that firms are underinvesting in compliance, 
relative to what would minimize their expected exposures. 
Why might firms do this? If compliance investment is not 
disclosed, investors will find it difficult to take into account the 
effects such a program will have on expected enforcement 
costs. 234  Moreover—as discussed above—disclosing extensive 
compliance investment is unlikely to be appealing, because this 
will reveal to investors the extent of the expected enforcement 
costs to which compliance responds.235  
2. Do Boards Have Sufficient Capacity? 
A complementary explanation, which is also consistent with 
our results, is that limits on board members’ time capacity may 
constrain their engagement in compliance oversight in most 
companies.  
Two parts of our results are relevant to this. First, experi-
ence with CC use by one or more board members increases the 
likelihood that a company will adopt a CC. This is consistent 
with the existence of learning costs—the time and resources 
taken for board members to inform themselves of new develop-
ments. As a result, boards may plausibly be unaware of the ben-
efits of compliance committees unless these are relayed to them 
by a colleague with experience. This matches with a factor em-
phasized by our interviewees—that board members’ time is 
tightly constrained and they are highly focused in their activi-
ties. However, the fact that the effect of such experience is 
strongly positive suggests boards who do learn about CCs find 
them worthwhile to adopt. In turn, this implies that boards’ tight 
focus may come at the price of learning about potentially benefi-
cial innovations in governance.  
A second relevant aspect of our results is the linkage we re-
port in Table 6 between board size, the proportion of board par-
ticipation in the AC, and CC adoption.236 While these correla-
tions, by themselves, do not suggest any particular causal 
 
 233. Supra Part II.D.3. 
 234. This discussion draws on a fuller argument set out by three of us else-
where. See Armour et al., supra note 31. 
 235. Id. at 23–24. 
 236. Supra Part II.D.3. 
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relationship, we think they are suggestive, in light of the capac-
ity constraints of board members who might be candidates for 
service on a CC. As is well-known, widely-accepted norms of 
“good governance” prescribe that at least a majority of a public 
company’s board should be independent. 237  Moreover, public 
companies are required to establish an AC staffed exclusively by 
independent directors.238 To be independent, one cannot be an 
employee of the company.239 This means that independent direc-
torships must necessarily be part-time positions. Boards (and 
board committees) meet several times a year. At each relevant 
meeting, board members will spend a day or so preparing for the 
meeting by reading the materials. But outside these periods, in-
dependent directors will not be engaging with the company’s af-
fairs. To do more might challenge their status as non-employees, 
and hence their independence.  
At the same time, an influential school of thought empha-
sizes the performance benefits of “smaller boards.”240 In theory, 
optimal board size depends on a trade-off between various rele-
vant factors, such as range of expertise (suggesting more mem-
bers) and cohesiveness (suggesting fewer members).241 A body of 
practitioner literature focuses on the results of academic studies 
and practitioner surveys that report performance benefits asso-
ciated with boards of around ten to twelve members.242 While 
these results are averages that describe practice, in the hands of 
some corporate governance advisors they can easily acquire nor-
mative significance as “rules of thumb” that then constrain prac-
tice going forward.243  
 
 237. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL § 303A.01 
(2009) (“Listed companies must have a majority of independent directors.”). 
 238. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012)). 
 239. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., supra note 237, § 303A.02(b)(i) (“[A] director is 
not independent if . . . [t]he director is, or has been within the last three years, 
an employee of the listed company . . . .”). 
 240. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 241. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 242. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 243. AUSTL. INST. OF CO. DIRS., NUMBER OF DIRECTORS—BOARD SIZE 2, 
http://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/~/media/cd2/resources/director-resources/ 
director-tools/pdf/05446-3-1-mem-director-tools-gr-number-of-directors_a4-web 
.ashx [https://perma.cc/ELQ2-9VYF] (providing a “rule of thumb” suggesting 8–
12 directors for a large Australian listed company); see, e.g., Stephen Bain-
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Putting these pieces together, board independence and au-
dit committee requirements coupled with constraints—or even 
just some drag—on board size can easily add up to very tight 
limits on a board aggregate time budget. This, in turn, could con-
strain capacity to adopt a compliance committee. 
B. ENCOURAGING BOARD COMPLIANCE?  
One implication suggested by our empirical inquiry is the 
potential gap between the socially optimal and privately optimal 
board size and capacity. Board size, as we have observed, is heav-
ily influenced by academic studies (which have become conven-
tional wisdom) that indicate that smaller boards are associated 
with higher stock prices.244 For many companies, a CC would be 
costly from a shareholder point of view because of the diversion 
of constrained director attention away from business perfor-
mance issues—unless the company had previously been targeted 
as a violator, which is the pattern we observe.245 Yet greater 
compliance oversight at the board-level is likely to reduce the 
incidence of law violations by the firm.246 This is an implication 
of our study of CC charters, which shows the sharper focus and 
additional resources that compliance committees bring to com-
pliance oversight.247 It is highly unlikely that our system of crim-
inal and administrative enforcement has achieved the socially 
 
bridge, Board Size: Is There an Optimum?, STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE’S J.L., RELI-
GION, POL. & CULTURE (May 8, 2009), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/ 
professorbainbridgecom/2009/05/board-size-is-there-an-optimum.html [https:// 
perma.cc/22FC-9GRJ] (surveying academic literature and concluding that “[a] 
Korn/Ferry survey of corporate directors found: ‘According to respondents, the 
optimal board size is two inside directors and eight outside.’ Sounds about right 
to me.”); Nicholas J. Price, Best Practices: Board Size and Corporate Govern-
ance, DILIGENT INSIGHTS (Sept. 25, 2017), https://diligent.com/blog/board-size 
-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/BX3Z-ZB5V] (discussing prior studies 
and noting that “less is more”); Robert Reiss, The 10 Best Practices for an Effec-
tive Board, FORBES (Nov. 25, 2015, 8:47 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
robertreiss/2015/11/25/the-10-best-practices-for-an-effectiveboard/ 
#cb8f00f413b9 [https://perma.cc/6YX3-9RGC] (“The best group of an average-
sized American public company would be nine to twelve board members.”). The 
central academic paper is David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Compa-
nies with a Smaller Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185 passim (1996) (find-
ing inverse correlation between board size and firm value). 
 244. Supra Part III.A.2. 
 245. See supra Part II. 
 246. See supra Part II. 
 247. See supra Part II. 
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optimal level of corporate compliance. In short, pursuit of the 
privately optimal board size and structure may well have gener-
ated a board capacity constraint that results in a socially-subop-
timal adoption of compliance committees.  
Our empirical study shows that ninety-four percent of public 
companies still do not have compliance committees.248 Thus far 
public authorities have not mandated compliance committees ex-
cept in five corporate prosecutions, and occasionally in other ar-
eas of civil enforcement.249 In general, the enforcers mandate in-
creased compliance but have not taken the next corporate 
governance step.250 In this section we explore three mechanisms 
to close the gap between the socially optimal and privately opti-
mal level of board compliance oversight: first, an illustrative set 
of direct federal regulatory interventions; second, corporate gov-
ernance innovations to expand board capacity; and third, tough-
ening of the state corporate law director liability standard for 
failure of compliance oversight.251  
1. Regulatory Interventions To Strengthen Board Compliance  
Regulators could adopt a more directive role in requiring, or 
at least promoting, board responsibility for compliance. We have 
described a real reluctance among enforcers to require that 
boards create compliance committees.252 We have also described 
that more companies do create such committees when, following 
an enforcement action, prosecutors more strongly signal, if not 
require, that boards oversee compliance using a committee-
structure.253 An enforcement strategy, however, sends messages 
primarily to companies facing consequences for violations and 
only secondarily to others in industry that observe enforcement 
outcomes.254 Indeed, the lack of relationship between compliance 
committee adoption and exposure to DOJ enforcement (as prox-
ied by industry prosecution rates) suggests that these secondary 
 
 248. Supra Part II.A.3. 
 249. The OCC has sometimes required creation of board compliance commit-
tees as well. OCC Orders Bank to Refund Up to $14 Million, 60 CONSUMER FIN. 
L.Q. REP. 223 (2006). 
 250. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 251. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 252. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 253. See supra Part II.D. 
 254. See supra Part II.D. 
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messages are not getting through. It is more challenging for en-
forcers to send positive messages regarding best practices, as op-
posed to practices that result in enforcement and sanctions.  
What would a more directive regulatory regime look like? 
One option—surely overkill—would simply be to require all pub-
lic company boards to have a compliance committee. A more tai-
lored version would be to require CCs for companies in indus-
tries where the importance and density of federal regulation give 
rise to the greatest under-compliance concerns. For example, 
three industries where the public interest in compliance is espe-
cially high are: health care, in light of the federal economic sup-
port via Medicare and Medicaid; pharmaceuticals, in light of ex-
tensive federal standard setting and monitoring; and financial 
services, in light of the important consumer protection issues as 
well as the systemic stability concerns.255 A further measure 
would be for a regulator not only to require a CC but also estab-
lish standards of CC “best practice.” This would reduce the risk 
that CC activity was mostly window-dressing.256  
Another regulatory approach would look to augmenting the 
board’s compliance capacity, either as a general matter or for 
targeted industries. This approach has been followed in some 
settlement agreements, which require the appointment of a 
“board compliance expert” who participates in all board meetings 
with a compliance presentation.257 This is an outsider to the 
board with extensive compliance expertise who may be given 
prior notice of the compliance presentation and the opportunity 
 
 255. See supra note 16. 
 256. For example, the Corporate Integrity Agreement entered by Tenet 
Health Care, in a False Claims Act case, not only required that the chief com-
pliance officer report directly to the board, but that the compliance committee 
of the board conduct a review of the effectiveness of the compliance program. 
See Press Release, Office of Inspector General, OIG Executes Tenet Corporate 
Integrity Agreement Unprecedented Provisions Include Board of Directors Re-
view (Sept. 28, 2006), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/press/Tenet%20CIA% 
20press%20release.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW5E-EKAV]. 
 257. Corporate Integrity Agreement, Office of the Inspector General of the 
Department of Health and Human Services & Tuomey D/B/A Tuomey 
Healthcare System, at 1, 27 (2015) [hereinafter Corporate Integrity Agree-
ment]; see also Meghana Joshi, DOJ and OIG Increasing Focus on Personal Ex-
ecutive and Board Accountability: In Light of Recent Changes, Compliance Of-
ficers Should Incorporate a Number of Guidelines into Their Everyday Practice, 
18 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 23, 25 (2016). 
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to insist on deeper examination if dissatisfied.258 Alternatively, 
the regulator could require as part of its “qualification” require-
ments that the board have at least one director who would count 
as a “compliance expert” regarding the regulatory regime to 
which the company is subject.259 The combination of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act and stock exchange listing requirements 
achieved a similar objective regarding financial expertise of au-
dit committee members.260  
An approach that would provide more flexibility to boards 
would be for the primary regulator to require certifications from 
boards regarding their compliance oversight. Some agencies 
have followed this approach in resolving enforcement actions 
with non-complying companies.261 In the health care context, for 
example, the Department of Health and Human Services, Office 
of Inspector General issued guidance in 2015 to corporate boards 
on health care compliance, highlighting that “every Board is re-
sponsible for ensuring that its organization complies with rele-
vant Federal, State, and local laws.”262 There was a perception 
that boards were “inclined to address only global issues and view 
matters such as compliance as technical ‘day-to-day’ issues, 
which are the province of trained staff.”263 For that reason, some 
regulators have intensified their focus on the responsibility of 
directors.264 They have emphasized the role of the board in en-
suring ongoing risk assessment and auditing as well as regular 
“executive sessions” with members of the compliance team.265 
 
 258. Corporate Integrity Agreement, supra note 257, at 7–8. 
 259. Joshi, supra note 257, at 25. 
 260. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat. 746 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012)); see also N.Y STOCK EXCH., INC., supra note 
237, § 303A.06–07; NASDAQ LISTING RULE § 5605(c) (2009). 
 261. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH 
CARE GOVERNING BOARDS ON COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT 16 (2015). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Joseph T. Kelley III, Board Governance, Compliance, and Behavioral 
Health, HEALTH CARE L. ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE, 2015 WL 9182494, at 
*1 (2016). 
 264. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. ET AL., THE HEALTH CARE DIRECTOR’S 
COMPLIANCE DUTIES: A CONTINUED FOCUS OF ATTENTION AND ENFORCEMENT 
(2011). 
 265. Kelley, supra note 263, at *5–6. 
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Boards may have taken heed of this.266 Agreements in the 
health care context often include “a resolution, signed by each 
member of the Board summarizing its review and oversight of 
[the center’s] compliance with Federal health care program re-
quirements and the obligations of this CIA [Corporate Integrity 
Agreement].”267 These agreements have included certifications 
of compliance, that the board has made a “reasonable inquiry” 
into compliance, including a “Compliance Review,” and that 
based on this, the board has concluded that the company has an 
“effective compliance” regime.268 Thus, the board’s oversight re-
sponsibilities are formally recognized and bolstered but without 
specifying a structure for that oversight. Such certifications 
could be mandated for all companies in certain regulated indus-
tries, or by all public companies and not just ones found to en-
gage in violations.  
2. Expanding Board Capacity Through Corporate Governance 
Innovation 
There are three readily identifiable corporate governance in-
novations that would expand board capacity. The first is to in-
crease board size with an eye towards increasing compliance 
committee adoptions. Increasing board size may stimulate a vir-
tuous circle in the case of compliance committees: increased 
board capacity lowers the cost of CC adoption (because there is 
less trade-off with board attention to core business matters); low-
ering the cost reduces the adverse signal of CC adoption; in turn, 
more CCs further reduce the adverse signal. This could be the 
approach of asset managers and other institutional investors 
who want to pursue (and to be seen pursuing) “stewardship” 
 
 266. Deann M. Baker, Key Methods to Develop and Mature Your Compliance 
Program, 10 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 37, 37 (2008). 
 267. Jeremy Sternberg, HHS-OIG Corporate Integrity Agreements Are Now 
Aiming at Corporate Directors and Executives, JDSUPRA (Oct. 31, 2013), http:// 
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/hhs-oig-corporate-integrity-agreements-a-11456/ 
[https://perma.cc/4S9P-6MZX]; see, e.g., Corporate Integrity Agreement Be-
tween The Office of Inspector General of the Dept. of Health and Human Serv. 
& Hutchinson Regional Med. Ctr. (2013). 
 268. Kathleen McDermott & Arianne Callender, Compliance Certifications 
and the Era of Accountability—A Forecast to Debate, 5 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 
158, 174–75 (2012). 
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agendas.269 Such investors commonly hold fully-diversified port-
folios.270 Compliance failures, meaning, violations of law, com-
monly result in negative externalities felt elsewhere in the port-
folio. 271  One does not need to believe that all regulation is 
optimal to think that compliance failures will on average result 
in social welfare losses that the diversified shareholder would 
prefer to avoid.  
For the firm that adopts a CC, a further strengthening of 
compliance oversight would come through explicit authorization 
in the committee charter to launch investigations and retain out-
side experts at its discretion. For example, the HCA Healthcare 
committee charter states that the committee “may retain any in-
dependent counsel, experts or advisors (accounting, financial or 
otherwise) that the Committee believes to be necessary or appro-
priate.”272 It also states that the “Committee may conduct spe-
cial reviews or investigations as it may deem necessary or appro-
priate to fulfill its responsibilities.”273  
A second possibility is the addition of a compliance expert as 
a director (which is easier if the board is expanded)274 or adopt-
ing through self-help the regulatory intervention described 
above. This proposal is to enlist a compliance expert to sit with 
the board during presentations of compliance-related matters, in 
observer/monitor status. This outsider would be more effective if 
he/she has a prior briefing on the compliance presentation and 
the opportunity to insist on deeper examination if he/she is dis-
satisfied. For example, Standard Chartered Bank, an interna-
tional bank headquartered in the UK, established a Board Fi-
nancial Crime Risk Committee in 2014, comprised of five 
independent directors and three external advisors with expertise 
and experience in combating financial crime.275  
 
 269. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: 2018 
ANNUAL REPORT (2018). 
 270. Armour et al., supra note 31, at 54. 
 271. Id. 
 272. HCA HEALTHCARE INC., AUDIT AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE CHARTER 
2 (2018), https://investor.hcahealthcare.com/sites/hcahealthcare.investorhq 
.businesswire.com/files/doc_library/file/HCA_-_Audit_and_Compliance_ 
Committee_Charter_Jan_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8CA-ZZWE]. 
 273. Id. at 8. 
 274. See Roy Snell, It’s Time to Get Serious About Board Expertise, 13 J. 
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 3 passim (2011). 
 275. Press Release, Standard Chartered, Standard Chartered Forms Board 
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A third possibility is to vary the board model to add an out-
side director who is specifically empowered to focus on the com-
pany’s compliance issues. Such a director would be sufficiently 
resourced to serve as an independent monitor of the company’s 
own compliance efforts. The required time and expertise would 
call for higher compensation levels than the typical part-time di-
rector of the current board model. This suggestion echoes a well-
known strand in the corporate governance literature, which 
questions the efficacy of part-time boards and looks for a new 
category of director. 276  One important question is whether 
higher director pay would compromise director independence, 
because the director with a sweet deal would have a special rea-
son to avoid antagonizing the CEO. The increasingly important 
role of the independent nominating-governance committee in 
identifying director candidates and vetting the director perfor-
mance should offer some protection on this dimension.277 Service 
in this role might be time-limited and directors could well seek a 
reputation for vigorous compliance oversight.  
While it appears that tools are at hand to increase board ca-
pacity to facilitate engagement with compliance, a question re-
mains whether boards have sufficient incentives to wish to do so. 
These incentives are clearly affected by their corporate law du-
ties, to which we now turn.  
 
Financial Crime Risk Committee (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.sc.com/en/media/ 
press-release/standard-chartered-forms-board-financial-crime-risk-committee/ 
[https://perma.cc/7W3T-SK9R].  
 276. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Out-
side Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991). 
More recently Professors Gilson and Gordon have proposed an optional board 
model in which companies could chose to add “empowered directors” who would 
have much deeper engagement with the firm and who would be given additional 
resources and access (and compensation). The focus of their concern has been 
the firm’s strategy and operational performance, but the model could be focused 
on compliance oversight for firms where compliance failures are a major busi-
ness risk. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Board 3.0 – An Introduction, 
74 BUS. LAW. 351 (2019).  
 277. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL § 303A.04 
(2009) (requiring Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee consisting 
solely of independent directors and tasked with identifying qualified individuals 
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3. Toughening Director Liability Standards Under State 
Corporate Law  
A distinctly different direction would be for the Delaware 
courts to increase the prospect of director liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty as respects compliance oversight failures. Under 
the Caremark standard, boards’ duties to engage in good faith 
oversight have two aspects: a general (and on-going) duty to en-
sure that there is a system of compliance in place, and a specific 
and conditional obligation to respond in good faith to any “red 
flags” that this system should subsequently bring up. 278  A 
breach of duty can be triggered only by a failure of oversight so 
comprehensive as to call into question the board’s good faith.279 
The practical question for boards is the extent to which they 
are required by their duties to act in relation to monitoring. The 
answer, at least as regards ensuring there is a system of over-
sight in place, is that their actual obligation is minimal. In Chan-
cellor Allen’s view, the Caremark duty would only be violated by 
“a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise over-
sight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable 
information and reporting system exists.”280 Or, as the Delaware 
Supreme Court subsequently put it in Stone v. Ritter,281 that 
“the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or infor-
mation system or controls.” 
This boils down to a continuing monitoring obligation that 
is essentially binary: either there is no effort at all, or there is 
some effort. Any level of positive effort greater than zero seems 
to suffice for directors to meet their fiduciary obligations in this 
context. Consider the following account of the sorts of board-level 
failures that would be necessary to ground a claim for liability:282  
  
 
 278. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 282. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2003); see also 
David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Account v. Citigroup, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1449-N, 
2006 WL 391931, at *1, *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2006). 
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[C]ontentions that the company lacked an audit committee, that the 
company had an audit committee that met only sporadically and de-
voted patently inadequate time to its work, or that the audit committee 
had clear notice of serious accounting irregularities and simply chose 
to ignore them or, even worse, to encourage their continuation.283 
The recent case of Horman v. Abney, concerning allegations 
of Caremark violations by the board of UPS in relation to the 
transportation of illegal tobacco products, provides an illustra-
tive example.284 The fact that the plaintiffs conceded that the 
board had established an audit committee whose responsibilities 
included “oversight of ‘the Company’s compliance with legal and 
regulatory requirements’” and that the board was “provided up-
dates about legal compliance through reports from the UPS Le-
gal Department” was fatal to their claim that the board had 
failed to implement any reporting or compliance systems.285 By 
simply establishing these structures, the board had met their 
Caremark obligations.286 
Of course, if the board actually came to be aware of any com-
pliance failures, then it will be much easier to argue that they 
acted in good faith if they did not follow them up vigorously.287 
Yet this gives board members a reason to prefer a less vigorous 
approach to continuing monitoring and oversight, on the basis 
that this will make it less likely that any compliance failure will 
ever come to their attention. Because a busy audit committee has 
less time to hear reports on compliance than does a dedicated 
compliance committee, they will be less likely to hear about any 
compliance failures. Yet the Delaware courts specifically eschew 
making judgments on the efficacy of reporting systems.288 As we 
 
 283. Shaev Profit Sharing Account, 2006 WL 391931, at *5.  
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have seen, the question is characterized as one of existence, ra-
ther than quality. Thus Caremark as read through Stone v. Rit-
ter may have a perverse effect on board-level compliance over-
sight. The creation of a CC, or even lodging a more explicit 
compliance function in another committee, creates duties and li-
ability risks that directors would not otherwise have and thus 
may discourage board-level compliance activity.   
By setting the hurdle for directors so low, the Caremark 
standard effectively precludes judicial consideration of compli-
ance issues, whether at board-level or below. One of the histori-
cal roles of the Delaware Chancery Court has been to build out 
the substance of fiduciary duty in wide-ranging contexts, not just 
through liability determinations but through developing ideas of 
“best practice” in the course of detailed analysis of particular 
cases.289 The almost-invariable dismissal of cases alleging the 
board’s failure of compliance oversight per the Caremark stand-
ard has cut off this path for development. This has left a vacuum 
in best practice of compliance into which federal prosecutors 
have stepped, increasingly requiring firms to upgrade their com-
pliance programs as a condition for a settlement.290 Unfortu-
 
total lack of any reporting system at GM; rather, the Plaintiffs allege the re-
porting system should have transmitted certain pieces of information, namely, 
specific safety issues and reports from outside counsel regarding potential pu-
nitive damages. In other words, GM had a system for reporting risk to the 
Board, but in the Plaintiffs’ view it should have been a better system.”); In re 
Lear Corp., 967 A.2d 640, 654 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“The complaint makes clear that 
the Lear board held regular meetings and received advice from several relevant 
experts. The plaintiffs have therefore not come close to pleading facts suggest-
ing that the Lear directors ‘consciously and intentionally disregarded their re-
sponsibilities’ and thereby breached their duty of loyalty.”); Shaev Profit Shar-
ing Account, 2006 WL 391931, at *5 (“The plaintiff conceded at oral argument 
that Citigroup had a wide range of compliance systems in place, and that they 
had no reason to believe that these systems were not functioning in a basic 
sense.”); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003).   
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99 (2014) (analyzing data on use of deferred prosecution agreements to mandate 
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nately, this discretionary “regulation by settlement” is seem-
ingly ill-equipped to guide boards how to discharge their respon-
sibilities.291  
A more assertive approach to oversight liability would have 
at least two beneficial consequences. On the one hand, it would 
encourage boards to take compliance oversight more seriously 
and trigger more energetic engagement with issues such as com-
mittee composition, the possibility of empowered board mem-
bers, and underlying compliance investment. At the same time, 
it would create the opportunity for the Delaware courts to begin 
once again to offer meaningful guidance as to governance prac-
tices. While judges may be diffident about their expertise on 
compliance, their failure to engage has left less-diffident prose-
cutors to engage in corporate governance oversight.292  
The Delaware Supreme Court appears to have signaled a 
tougher line on board engagement in compliance in its recent de-
cision in Marchand v. Barnhill,293 decided after earlier versions 
of this Article were circulated.294 This was a suit alleging breach 
of Caremark duties by the board of Blue Bell, an ice cream man-
ufacturer, which had suffered an outbreak of listeria ultimately 
causing the deaths of three people and considerable losses for the 
firm.295 Blue Bell had a compliance program that the plaintiff 
did not contest was in breach of applicable FDA regulations.296 
Rather, the plaintiff ’s claim was that the firm did not have in 
place a board-level system of compliance oversight, such that red 
flags about listeria in the firm’s processing plants were not re-
ported to the board until it was too late.297 For this reason, the 
Supreme Court rejected the company’s motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff ’s suit.298  
This decision is encouraging from the perspective of our 
analysis because the Court emphasizes that directors’ Caremark 
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obligations are specific and non-delegable: the board needs to at-
tend to the company’s central compliance risk and there must be 
a board-level oversight of the compliance mechanism put in 
place. “Caremark . . . does require that a board make a good faith 
effort to put in a reasonable system of monitoring and reporting 
about the corporation’s central compliance risks.”299 “[T]o satisfy 
their duty of loyalty, directors must make a good faith effort to 
implement an oversight system and then monitor it.”300 Thus, 
Marchand v. Barnhill appears to cabin Stone v. Ritter’s highly 
deferential approach to evaluating the sufficiency of board com-
pliance oversight. Caremark read through Marchand now seems 
to require board compliance oversight matched to the external 
compliance regime.  
Of course, a more demanding interpretation of directors’ fi-
duciary oversight duties by no means implies that companies 
should automatically establish a CC. We view it as important to 
focus on the board’s separate and independent responsibility to 
assure compliance, but the evidence described in this Article 
does not support any requirement of a board CC as a matter of 
state fiduciary law. Rather, board compliance depends on sound 
management compliance, using a variety of mechanisms.  
  CONCLUSION   
In this Article, we present empirical findings concerning 
how, contrary to the existing literature, far fewer public compa-
nies in the U.S. adopt board compliance committees than previ-
ously understood. We find that less than 5% of public companies 
have board-level compliance committees. What explains this 
pattern, largely of non-adoption of board compliance commit-
tees?  
To make headway, we use our data to explore why boards 
(do not) establish compliance committees. We present four main 
findings. First, companies that get prosecuted are much more 
likely to establish compliance committees. Yet this is not because 
prosecutors specifically require them to do so. We review a com-
prehensive dataset of DPAs and plea bargains entered into by 
public companies from 2001 onwards. In only 5 of 374 cases (less 
than 2%) do these agreements actually stipulate the creation of 
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some kind of board compliance committee. Rather, the link ap-
pears indirect. Prosecutors do frequently demand enhancements 
to a firm’s compliance activities as part of settlements, creating 
a sharp increase in need for compliance oversight, which boards 
rationally meet by establishing committees. 
Second, we find only weak links between factors that might 
make a firm’s exposure to potential prosecution seem more 
likely—such as being in a heavily regulated sector, or a high rate 
of prior prosecution in their industry. This suggests that even 
firms for which compliance might be very important are not tak-
ing it sufficiently seriously to justify establishment of a dedi-
cated committee. These results suggest that boards take compli-
ance more seriously after their firm has got caught. Does this 
imply a troublingly low background level of board compliance? 
Our other results give further cause for concern.  
Third, we find that outside experience of board compliance 
makes a difference. Companies with a board member who also 
sits on the board of a firm that already has a CC are much more 
likely to establish one themselves. This finding that outside ex-
perience matters is consistent with the general literature of dif-
fusion of innovations. Moreover, it suggests that these directors’ 
experience of board compliance is generally positive, as it in-
creases the likelihood of adoption by other boards on which they 
serve. Why, then, are CCs not more widely adopted? 
Our fourth result is that boards with compliance committees 
tend to be larger and have more independent directors. This, 
again, reinforces the idea that compliance oversight is real work 
for the board: bigger boards have more capacity. Board capacity 
is subject to external constraints: institutional investors, proxy 
advisors, and others advocate small boards comprised mainly of 
independent persons, who have no employment relationship 
with the firm. This may mean boards often lack capacity to do 
compliance oversight other than as an audit committee adden-
dum. 
These results are at once intriguing and troubling. While 
our data do not permit any causal interpretation of the findings, 
they are consistent with theoretical claims that compliance is 
more often overlooked, rather than overseen, by boards. This has 
implications for both corporate law and corporate prosecutions, 
which have sought to promote greater board oversight of compli-
ance. 
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We concluded by considering ways in which board compli-
ance might be facilitated or encouraged: reconsidering norms 
about board size and independence, enhancing accountability of 
directors to regulators, and tightening state law fiduciary duties 
regarding oversight. Compliance programs seek to prevent some 
of the most serious and socially harmful corporate misconduct. 
The role of corporate boards in monitoring the compliance pro-
gram has become increasingly pivotal and deserves more atten-
tion from both inside and outside of the boardroom. 
 
 
